The Continuing Showdown over Who Should Regulate Amusement Attraction Safety:  A Critical Analysis of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Should Remain State-Governed. by Emerson, Chad
1The Continuing Showdown Over Who Should Regulate 
Amusement Attraction Safety:
A Critical Analysis of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety 
Should Remain State-Governed 
By:  Chad D. Emerson
Assistant Professor of Law
Faulkner University
Thomas Goode Jones School of Law
2The Continuing Showdown Over Who Should Regulate Amusement Park Safety:
A Critical Analysis of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Should Remain 
State-Governed
I. Introduction
Every year, millions and millions of Americans hurtle through space toward 
Mars, freefall down the shafts of once-forgotten elevators, and become real-life crash test 
dummies through a series of harrowing and near disastrous auto tests — and they do it all 
without suffering so much as a scratch.
Such is life in a magical kingdom.
Today, at amusement parks across the country guests test the thrills of 
increasingly high-tech multi-million dollar rides and attractions.  Destinations like Walt 
Disney World, Universal Orlando, Busch Gardens and the various Six Flags parks all 
provide the average American an opportunity to try unique experiences — and to test 
their mettle while doing so — on rides with such notorious names as Dueling Dragons, 
Demon Drop, and the Tower of Terror.
Yet, for all the high energy thrills enjoyed by guests (including this author), an 
important question remains:  Are these high-tech attractions really safe?  And, more 
importantly, who ultimately decides what “safe” means?
In the theme park industry, injuries and even deaths do occur.  However, while 
any death or serious injury is certainly tragic, the statistics to date all demonstrate that 
serious injuries and deaths are very rare in the fixed-site amusement park industry.1
Despite this, several members of Congress have, over the years, introduced various bills 
that seek to assign complete safety regulatory authority over fixed-site amusement parks 
to the federal government, and more particularly the United States Consumer Product 
Safety Commission (the “CPSC”).  
The National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act of 2003 (the “NAPRSA”) is 
another effort in that direction.  The bill itself is a short one-page bill that essentially 
seeks to reverse a 1981 amendment to the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (the 
“CPSA”).2  That amendment sought to clarify that fixed-site amusement parks do not fall 
within the CPSC’s jurisdiction.3  The proponents of overturning this 1981 amendment are 
seeking to federalize the safety regulation of fixed-site attractions. They point to an 
alleged increase in guest injuries, and the fact that some states have not enacted safety 
regulations, as sufficiently compelling grounds for removing this authority from the states 
and transferring it to the CPSC.
Not surprisingly, the amusement park industry has staunchly opposed any efforts 
to federalize the safety regulation of fixed-site amusement parks by arguing that the 
existing state and local regulations have effectively protected the general public’s 
1In most statutes, including the Consumer Product Safety Act, an amusement attraction is “any mechanical 
device which carries or conveys passengers along, around, or over a fixed or restricted route or course or 
within a defined area for the purpose of giving its passengers amusement”. 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (2003); See
also Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 7901 (Lexis 2003) and N.Y. Lab. Law § 870-c (Consol. 2003). A “fixed-site” 
amusement park would be one containing amusement attractions that are permanently attached to the 
premises. 
2 See H.R. 2207, 108th Cong. (May 22, 2003).
3 See Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 724 (1981).
3amusement-riding safety to date and, therefore, there is no reason to disturb the status 
quo.   
This article will trace the development and current status of consumer safety 
regulation in general with a specific focus on fixed-site amusement park safety 
regulation.  In doing so, the article will demonstrate that, historically, the development of 
fixed-site amusement park safety regulations has been a state-governed issue falling 
under the scope of the traditional state police power doctrine.  The article will then 
analyze the states’ current safety laws and regulations and will argue that keeping these 
regulations within the states’ regulatory province will successfully accomplish the 
ultimate goal of protecting amusement park guest safety better than the current 
Congressional effort to federalize fixed-site attraction safety regulation under the CPSC.  
Finally, because several states have no existing regulations—and because several other 
states have very minimal regulations--this article will offer a proposed model state safety 
law for fixed-site amusement parks based upon a comparative analysis of existing state 
regulations.
II. The Development and Current Status of Consumer Safety and Fixed-Site 
Amusement Park Safety Regulation.
In order to understand the state of today’s amusement park laws and regulation, 
one must first identify the legal principles that preceded these laws.  Doing so provides 
not only a chronological understanding of the history of these laws, but also provides 
greater insight into the substance of these laws.  In other words, not just “how” they came 
to be, but “why” they came to be.  This provides a historical legal context for an issue 
such as amusement park safety regulation that—since amusement parks themselves are a 
relatively recent cultural phenomenon—many might presume is a fairly nascent area of 
regulatory coverage.  
In fact, the opposite is true. While amusement parks were only introduced to 
audiences in the United States in the last century, the underlying legal concept—
consumer safety regulation—has a long, and somewhat abstract, history in this country.  
A. The State’s Traditional Police Power over Consumer Safety Issues: the 
Origin of Amusement Park Safety Regulation.
"The [s]tates traditionally have had great latitude under 
their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the 
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons." 4
Generally, the states’ authority to regulate fixed-site amusement parks has been 
established through each State’s “police power” to govern public safety. The term “police 
power,” however, is not found in the United States Constitution.  Search for the same 
term in the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation or even the Magna 
Carta and one still will not find it.  In other words, the term “police power” is noticeably 
absent from all of these democracy-shaping documents.  Yet despite this absence, courts 
4 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751 (1985)(internal 
quotation marks omitted).
4in the United States have consistently recognized that the states possess certain police 
powers — most notably over issues involving public safety, health, and morals.5  And, 
even more importantly, the states have generally not simply recognized these powers in 
the abstract, but have utilized them to safeguard their citizens from various dangers —
including those caused by consumer products.6
Despite the fact that the states had historically exercised their police powers to 
govern safety issues, a trend toward allowing the federal government to exercise 
regulatory authority over several traditionally State-governed matters began to develop in 
the mid to late 1800s. This development evolved out of the Supreme Court’s expansive 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause in light of the federal government’s attempt to use 
that clause to federalize issues that had heretofore been governed by the states.7
One of the first examples of the United States Supreme Court permitting the 
federal government to regulate an area that had traditionally been governed by states 
occurred in Gibbons v. Ogden.8  In Gibbons, the Supreme Court was called upon to 
5 What is the source of these fairly vague yet highly important powers?  Unfortunately, the answer is not as 
simple as citing a Constitutional clause or amendment.  Instead, the idea of the State’s police powers is 
founded in a sort of “natural law” type argument. As early as the mid 1800s, the United States Supreme 
Court had begun recognizing that States possessed certain regulatory powers termed “police powers”. The 
Court rhetorically asked “[W]hat are the police powers of a State?” in 1847. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 
U.S. 504, 583 (1847). 
Yet, the Court’s own answer to that question did little to pinpoint the exact origin of these powers.  
Instead, the Court seemed to adopt a position that the States’ police powers were more akin to natural rights 
“inherently” afforded a sovereign rather than regulatory powers established by code or law.  “They are 
nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its 
dominions. . .” Id. (emphasis added).
The Court’s ambiguity in citing the source of such extensive powers is striking.  In many ways it 
adopts the approach of “I know it is here, but I have no idea how it got here.”  Nevertheless, while the 
courts have uniformly agreed that the States’ police powers exist, they continually have struggled to 
pinpoint the source of this existence:  “[t]his power is, and must be from its very nature, incapable of any 
very exact definition or limitation.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62  (1872). It is worth noting 
though that the inability to define the precise source of these powers has not been isolated to a single set of 
jurists.  Instead, this issue has perplexed more than one Court: “What that power is, it is difficult to define 
with sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making regulations promotive of domestic order, 
morals, health, and safety.”  Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470-471 (1877).
6 In addition to theoretical underpinnings, the States’ police powers remained intact post-Constitution 
because of a very practical reality:  the States were generally best-situated and best-equipped to exercise 
police powers: “Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police powers to protect the 
health and safety of their citizens. Because these are ‘primarily, and historically, ... matter[s] of local 
concern.’" Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated 
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
7
 Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion in U.S. v Lopez gives a concise examination of Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
One of his primary arguments is that since the New Deal, its language has been misinterpreted by 
the “substantial effects” test. “This test, if taken to its logical extreme, would give Congress a ‘police 
power’ over all aspects of American life.” Id. at 584. Nothing would be excluded from the reach of the 
Commerce Clause.
When the Constitution was written, commerce had a narrow definition, consisting of “selling, 
buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.” Id. at 585. The problem arises today 
when the Court fails to distinguish between interstate commerce, wholly intrastate commerce, and 
activities that affect interstate commerce. Id. at 595.
8 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
5determine the constitutionality of a New York state law granting exclusive license to 
operate steamships within its waters to Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton. Ogden 
claimed an exclusive right, granted by Livingston and Fulton, to operate a steamship on 
the route between New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and brought suit 
against Gibbons to prevent him from competing on the same route. New Jersey and 
Connecticut had conflicting statutes regulating steam travel on their waterways. The 
Court determined that the New York statute inhibited commerce among the states, and 
“that Congress may control the State laws, so far as it may be necessary to control them, 
for the regulation of commerce.”9
Gibbons essentially opened the door for the federal government to regulate 
traditionally state-governed issues if it deemed itself best situated to do so. While 
somewhat slow to embrace this notion within the context of consumer safety regulation, 
by the end of the century, the federal government began to displace the states as the chief 
regulator of consumer safety.
B. The Federal Government’s Push Toward Exercising Regulatory Jurisdiction 
Over Consumer Safety Issues.
Even though the mainstream media’s interest in fixed-site amusement park safety 
regulation has only been piqued relatively recently10, the federal government’s effort to 
obtain regulatory control over amusement attractions in fixed-site attractions is not a 
recent development.  In fact, during the mid 1970s and early 1980s, the CPSC actually 
filed several complaints seeking regulatory sanctions against operators of amusement 
attractions within fixed-site attractions.  Not surprisingly, a slew of lawsuits over this 
issue quickly ensued between fixed-site parks and the CPSC.  In 1981, however, just 
before the United States Supreme Court was prepared to hear oral arguments on this 
issue, Congress passed an amendment to the CPSA that finally clarified that fixed-site 
amusement parks do not fall within the CPSC’s regulatory jurisdiction.  
Today—over two decades later—a variety of legal and political forces have 
revived this issue, returning it to the national spotlight.  To truly understand the complex 
dynamics at work, one must return to the origin of this dispute:  Congress’ first steps 
toward regulating consumer safety on a federal level.
9 Id. at 206.
10
  While accidents, and amusement park safety in general, have always received media coverage, such 
coverage has grown increasingly widespread within recent years.  The following reports and articles are a 
survey of the growing scope and type of media outlets covering this issue: CNN String of Amusement Park
Accidents Causing Concern (Aug. 26, 1999), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9908/26/rollercoasters.01/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004); CNN, 
Congressional Panel Begins Hearings on Roller Coaster Safety(May 17, 2000), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/05/17/amusement.park.safety/index.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004); Eye on 
America: Amusement Park Accidents May Be More Widespread Than Believed (CBS Evening News 
television broadcast Aug. 20, 2001); Troubling Summer for Amusement Parks (ABC World News Sunday 
television broadcast, Aug. 29, 1999); John Seewer, Amusement Parks Put Science Into the Scream, Say It 
Makes Rides Safer, AP WORLDSTREAM, June 10, 2002; Sean Wood, Congressman to Press for Federal 
Regulation of Amusement Parks, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 25, 2003.
61. The Federal Government’s First Steps Toward National Consumer 
Safety Regulation.
During much of its first one hundred years of existence, Congress generally 
avoided the regulation of consumer safety on a national level.  Instead, Congress left it to 
the states, through their inherent police powers, to regulate consumer safety issues such 
as product safety, food safety, drug safety, and other consumer-related activities.11 In 
1879, however, the United States Department of Agriculture took the lead in one of the 
first efforts toward federalizing a consumer safety issue. The department, led by its chief 
chemist Peter Collier, lobbied Congress to pass a bill giving them general regulatory 
authority over food products. 12  These efforts were largely induced by two events: 1) the 
growing scientific knowledge of germ theory and how it could contaminate the food 
supply; and 2) the increasing problem of consumers unknowingly purchasing adulterated 
food as the economy and society shifted from a local food supply to a more nationalized 
food supply.13
This debate ended up pitting supporters of the farming industry, who favored a 
national law protecting the “natural” food supply, against the food-processing industry 
that opposed efforts to restrict the use of preservatives designed to alter the color, flavor, 
11In 1784, for example, Massachusetts passed a law regarding food standards in what is generally 
considered to be one of the first consumer regulatory acts in this country. FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/aboutcvm/ aboutbeg.htm (accessed Dec. 6, 2004).  
Whereas some evilly disposed persons, from motives of avarice and filthy lucre, have 
been induced to sell corrupted, contagious or unwholesome provisions, to the great 
nuisance of public health and peace : 
Be it therefore enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, That
if any person shall sell any such diseased, corrupted, contagious or
unwholesome provisions, whether for meat or drink, knowing the
same, without making it known to the buyer, and being thereof convicted
before the Justices of the General Sessions of the Peace, in the
county where such offence shall be committed, or the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court, he shall be punished by fine, imprisonment,
standing in the pillory, and binding to the good behaviour, or one or
more of these punishments, to be inflicted according to the degree
and aggravation of the offence.
An Act Against Selling Unwholesome Provisions, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 50 (1784), available at 
http://www.state.ma.us/dph/pdf/s98-1.pdf (as of Mar. 8, 2004).
12 FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CURRENT AND USEFUL INFORMATION FROM THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION (1999), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/mileston.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
13 JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR THE 1906 LAW
(1981), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/ history2.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004); One example 
of this problem involved the “embalmed beef scandal”.  This scandal arose out of canned meat that had a 
suspicious grayish coloring and had been served to American soldiers (such as the famous Rough Riders) 
during the war.  Allegations arose that this beef was actually partially-decomposed meat that had been 
spoiled in the humid climate of the war’s locale.  These unsanitary conditions were blamed on, among other 
things, improperly trained food personnel and improperly regulated food conditions.  Ultimately, the 
scandal led to a series of charges before a court of inquiry as well as improved food regulations. See
Edward F. Keuchel, Chemicals and Meat: The Embalmed Beef Scandal of the Spanish-American War, 48 
BULLETIN OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 249-264 (1974).
7texture, and other features of the food supply.  Advocates of a federal law for regulating 
the food supply pressed the issue with their argument that existing state regulations were 
insufficient to protect the general public.  As one commentator described the debate: 
Discoveries in chemistry, for example, led to new synthetic medicines and 
altered radically both the growing and the processing of food.  
Transportation developments brought processed food to an increasingly 
national market, making the growth of giant cities possible.  The residents 
of those cities lost the ability villagers had possessed of being first-hand 
judges of the food they ate.14
In essence, advocates of a federal approach based their arguments on the premise 
that, even though the food supply might have previously been effectively regulated by the 
states in a generally local and intrastate society, the urbanization of America had created 
a much more interstate food supply.  Because of this, the federal government was better 
situated to efficiently regulate such a national food supply.  As one commentator wrote:
[t]he debate in 1886 between the defenders of a natural food and those of 
its alleged artificial substitute centered not only on matters of vested 
interest, but also pondered concerns about the public health, issues of 
governmental authority, and the myths in which were enshrined the 
meaning of the American experience.15
Despite persistent efforts to pass such a law, Congress failed to enact any national 
regulation for the remainder of the 19th century. As the 20th century began, however, 
support for national consumer food safety legislation continued to increase to the point 
that it appeared such a law was likely.  One of the primary forces behind this increased 
support was Upton Sinclair’s 1906 book The Jungle, in which he exposed some of the 
increasingly unhygienic practices of the meatpacking industry.  Faced with documented 
evidence of serious abuses in the nation’s food supply, public opinion quickly shifted and 
soon President Theodore Roosevelt, who until now had offered very little, if any, support 
for a national consumer food safety law, now also pressed Congress to pass such a 
national law. 
Those efforts finally succeeded in June 1906, when Congress reversed course and 
passed both the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act.16  These laws are 
generally considered to be the first federal laws regulating consumer safety.17 And, in 
14 JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR THE 1906 LAW
(1981), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/ history2.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
15 Id.
16
 Lest anyone think that these Acts represent little more than a minor historical footnote, the national 
importance of the Pure Food and Drugs Act was confirmed on January 15, 1998 when the United States 
Postal Service released a commemorative stamp as part of a series of stamps honoring the major historical 
events of the United States from the 20th Century. See Press Release, United States Department of Health 
and Human Services, New Stamp Honors The First Comprehensive National Food And Drug Law (Jan. 13, 
1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00613.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
17
 While they were certainly the most noteworthy and publicized laws, whether these two laws were 
actually the “first” consumer safety laws is debatable.  For example, in 1883, Congress passed the an act to 
8many ways, they were the first steps in a dramatic chain of events that would forever 
change the states’ roles in regulating consumer safety issues. 18
2. The Continued Growth of the Federal Government’s Regulation of 
Consumer Safety Issues.
The federalization of consumer safety regulation certainly did not begin and end 
with food and drugs.19  In fact, over the next 60 years, Congress continued to expand the 
federal government’s role in regulating consumer safety issues beyond food and drugs 
and into a wide range of other consumer products and activities.  However, rather than 
taking an omnibus approach toward regulating consumer products and activities as a 
whole, Congress chose to accomplish this expansion through a series of self-standing acts 
that regulated individual consumer products and that were administered by a variety of 
different federal department and agencies.  In fact, the broad, decentralized nature of the 
federal government’s consumer regulatory activities was evidenced by the fact that, at 
regulate the purity of imported tea. Impure Tea Act, 22 Stat. 451 (1883). Likewise, in 1902, Congress 
passed a different act to regulate the safety of certain vaccines and medicines offered to the public. 
Biologics Control Act, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902).
Regardless of which law should be given the title of “first federal consumer safety law”, the fact 
remains that the era from 1879 to 1906 ushered in the federal government’s intrusion into the previously 
State- dominated province of consumer safety and health regulation.
18
 Roosevelt’s signing of the Meat Inspection Act and Pure Food and Drug Act were two examples of the 
trend toward “nationalizing” issues that affected citizens of more than just one state or locality.  Termed 
“The New Nationalism”, Roosevelt’s own words clearly signaled the growing trend away from a State-
centric regulatory system and toward a Federal Government-driven system:
I do not ask for overcentralization; but I do ask that we work in a spirit of broad and far-
reaching nationalism when we work for what concerns our people as a whole…The 
national government belongs to the whole American people, and where the whole 
American people are interested, that interest can be guarded effectively only by the 
national government. The betterment which we seek must be accomplished, I believe, 
mainly through the national government….The American people are right in demanding 
that New Nationalism, without which we cannot hope to deal with new problems. The 
New Nationalism puts the national need before sectional or personal advantage. It is 
impatient of the utter confusion that results from local legislatures attempting to treat 
national issues as local issues.
Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, Address in Osawatomie, Kansas (Aug. 31, 1910), available at
http://www.tamu.edu/ comm/pres/speeches/trnew.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2004).
19
 Nor did the regulation of food and drugs themselves begin and end with the Pure Food and Drug Act.  In 
fact the federal government would take two more important regulatory actions concerning consumer safety 
regulation as it relates to food and drugs before 1940. First, in 1927, Congress created a new regulatory 
administration charged with regulating consumer safety over these products. 44 Stat. 976, 1002 (1927).  
The agency was named the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration and would later become known as 
today’s Food and Drug Administration.  46 Stat. 392, 422 (1930).
The second pivotal event occurred in 1938 when Congress enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(h), 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 
321(h)(1994)). Among its groundbreaking provisions, this Act required manufacturers to obtain product 
safety approval prior to offering a new drug to the public and also authorized the new federal agency to 
conduct factory inspections and bring court actions to enforce its food and drug regulations.
9one point, 33 different departments and agencies regulated over 100 various consumer 
activities.20
For example, in 1953, Congress passed the Flammable Fabrics Act.21  This Act 
arose after a series of high profile incidents in which children wearing cowboy playsuits 
were seriously injured or killed after the outfits they were wearing ignited.  Support for 
the Act was further bolstered following a series of instances in which individuals were 
seriously injured or killed when the sweaters they were wearing ignited.22  When passed, 
the Act essentially gave the Federal Trade Commission complete regulatory authority 
over the safety of consumer clothing.  Subsequently, in 1967, the Flammable Fabrics Act 
was expanded to also give the Federal Trade Commission general safety regulatory 
authority over interior furnishings such as rugs and carpets also. 23
Another example of Congress’ piecemeal approach of regulating specific 
products, rather than consumer activities as a whole, was the Refrigerator Safety Act.24
The Refrigerator Safety Act was passed in 1956 following several years of increasing 
deaths among children who had suffocated after being trapped in refrigerators that, when 
closed, could not be opened from the inside.25  Both the Flammable Fabrics Act and the 
Refrigerator Safety Act were lauded as important advancements in the safeguarding of 
American consumers.  However, by their very nature, both acts were very limited in the 
scope of their application.  Ultimately, Congress concluded that this piecemeal (and, 
arguably, unorganized) approach to consumer safety regulation had negatively affected 
consumer safety as a whole:  “the scattering of these activities in ofttimes minute 
organizational units resulted in a loss of focus and commitment on the part of those 
responsible.”26
As the nation proceeded into the 1960s, an increasing number of consumer 
product related deaths and injuries led Congress to reexamine its product-by-product 
regulatory approach.  Many in Congress believed that the growing use of automated 
technology as a component of many consumer products had created a very dangerous 
scenario that warranted increased consumer safety regulations:
The end of World War II is a convenient point in time from which to 
consider what may be called a technological revolution in home products.  
Even the most modest homes today have numerous items—many of which 
are potentially dangerous—which were unthought of, or at least 
unattainable prior to World War II…..For the most part this is a boon and 
an important contribution to an enviable progress in our society.  
20 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1361, at 4 (1970).
21
 Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (Pub. L. No. 83-88, 67 Stat. 111 (1953)). 
22 S. REP. NO. 83-400 (1953). These high profile incidents included one particularly concerning case of an 
individual’s sweater igniting while he was sitting in court one afternoon.  
23
 Pub. L. No. 90-189, 81 Stat. 568 (1967). In 1972, Congress re-assigned regulatory authority over 
personal clothing and interior furnishings from the Federal Trade Commission to the newly established 
CPSC. Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972).
24 Refrigerator Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211−1214 (Pub. L. No.  84-930, 70 Stat. 953 (1956)).
25 S. REP. NO. 84-2700 (1956).
26 H.R. REP. NO. 91-1361, at 6 (1970).
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However, such devices and numerous others in and related to the home 
too often have unwanted side effects.27
In light of this apparent concern that the use of technology in consumer products 
was outpacing safety, combined with its belief that existing state, local, and industry 
regulations were insufficient28, Congress decided to wholly re-examine its approach to 
consumer safety regulation.  In 1961, Congress took one of its first steps toward 
extensively studying the issue of consumer product safety when the House Subcommittee 
on Intergovernmental Relations commissioned a study entitled “Consumer Protection 
Activities of the Federal Departments and Agencies.”29  This study analyzed the federal 
government’s role in consumer safety activities to date and was followed the next term by 
two additional subcommittee reports addressing “Consumer Protection Activities of State 
Governments”.30  These studies were a precursor to a broad new Congressional effort 
aimed at federalizing much of the consumer product safety field.
On November 20, 1967, Congress took a large step toward the federalization of 
consumer safety regulation when it established the National Commission on Product 
Safety (“NCPS”).31  This “temporary” 32 commission was charged with researching the 
sufficiency and scope of the existing federal consumer product safety laws and then 
transmitting a final report to the President and to the Congress within two years.33  In 
particular, Congress required that the NCPS consider the following four subjects:
(1) the identity of categories of household products, except such 
products excluded in section 6, whch [sic] may present an unreasonable 
hazard to the health and safety of the consuming public;
(2) the extent to which self-regulation by industry affords such 
protection;
(3) the protection against such hazardous products afforded at 
common law in the States, including the relationship of product warranty 
to such protection; and 
(4) a review of Federal, State, and local laws relating to the protection 
of consumers against categories of such hazardous products, including the 
scope of coverage, the effectiveness of sanctions, the adequacy of 
27 H.R. REP. NO. 90-882, at 1925 (1967).
28
 Congress’ belief that a non-federal approach toward consumer safety was ineffective was demonstrated 
by the finding in H.R. REP. NO. 90-882 that “[I]ndustry, local government, and State government interests 
are aware of the problem and numerous regulations and statutes have been enacted , but no one has been 
heard to say that there is not a real need for improvement in this area…” Id.
29 H.R. REP. NO. 87-1241(1961).
30 H.R. REP. NO. 88-445 (1963); H.R. REP. NO. 88-921 (1963).
31
 Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466 (1967), amended by Pub. L. No. 91-51, 83 Stat. 86 (1969). 
32
  “Temporary” in the sense that the express terms of Pub. L. No. 90-146 required that “[n]inety days after 
submission of its final report, as provided in section 2(c), the Commission shall cease to exist.”
33
 The original bill establishing the National Commission on Product Safety mandated that the commission 
transmit its report within “two years from the date of approval of this joint resolution” which would have 
been November 20, 1969.  See Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466, 500 (1967).  However, administrative 
matters delayed President Lyndon B. Johnson’s appointment of the commission until March 27, 1968.  As a
result, Congress extended the deadline for the commission’s final report until June 30, 1970.  See Pub. L. 
No. 91-51, 83 Stat. 86 (1969).
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investigatory powers, the uniformity of application, and the quality of 
enforcement.34
As part of its effort, the NCPS researched hundreds of different consumer 
products35—ultimately identifying in excess of 300 categories of products that remained 
unregulated under the existing regulatory schemes.36   These products ranged the gamut 
from children’s toys to lawn care products.37
After completing its research, the NCPS completed its charge by submitting to 
Congress and the Nixon administration a final report outlining its results.38  In short, the 
NCPS found the threat posed by consumer products to be “bona fide and menacing.”39
The report found that one of the primary causes of this threat was that Congress had 
passed too many stand-alone consumer safety laws governing different products.40 This 
created a lack of uniformity that led in turn to an unorganized and certainly less than 
comprehensive approach to regulating consumer safety.41  The NCPS proposed resolving 
this problem by creating an omnibus safety regulation covering nearly all consumer 
products and activities.42
Moreover, the Chairman of the NCPS was adamant that this issue simply could 
not be remedied through increased industry self-governance because “American industry 
may lack the incentive for safety necessary to overcome what may be an irreconcilable 
profit motive.”43  Therefore, “government must be its gadfly.”44
In addition to this perceived profit motive, the NCPS also concluded that an 
industry-governed solution would be ineffective because “[o]nly a few of the largest 
manufacturers have coherent, articulated safety engineering programs.”45 According to 
the NCPS, this not only resulted in many products whose engineering standards were 
dubious at best, but also resulted in sporadic manufacturer attempts to quantify consumer 
injury data and establish cost-benefit analyses for safety design changes.46
34
 Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466, 499 (1967).
35
 The fact that the NCPS chose to examine “consumer products” as a whole is interesting since its enabling 
legislation limited its mandate to “household products”—a seemingly much narrower scope of products.  
The NCPS apparently decided to sua sponte expand its mandate beyond the scope of its enabling 
legislation and include “consumer products” because “that term best describes our statutory mandate and 
most products which are not now subject to adequate Federal safety regulation.”  Hearing on National 
Commission On Product Safety Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong. 37 (1970)(hearing and 
final report presented to the President and Congress). While this decision might have been well-intentioned, 
as will become evident in the next section, the NCPS’ decision to essentially re-write the scope of its 
legislatively-assigned task ultimately would serve as a central issue in the litigation of whether fixed-site 
amusement parks ever fell within the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission’s jurisdiction.
36 Id. at 6.
37 Id. at 37.
38 Id. at 29.
39 Id. at 28.
40 Id. at 38.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 46,47.
43 Id. at 6.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 38.
46 Id.
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The NCPS also dismissed any idea that this issue could be effectively dealt with 
on the state government level:  
State and local laws also demonstrate the inadequacies of existing safety 
legislation.  These laws, often passed in response to specific tragedy, 
frequently deal with such isolated products as bedding, matches or 
exploding golf balls.  In addition the laws’ limited effectiveness in 
protecting consumers they often present significant obstacles to 
manufacturers who are forced to comply with conflicting State and local 
requirements.47
According to the NCPS, the ineffectiveness of a State-governed solution48 was 
compounded by the transient nature of consumer products:  “[m]anufacturers of 
hazardous products can make and ship out items that cannot be sold at retail in their own 
community.”49 The NCPS concluded that one solution to these issues was federal 
preemption in the field of consumer safety regulation because “[s]tates seldom impose 
safety standards for consumer products.”50
In light of these perceived problems with an industry or State-governed solution, 
the NCPS concluded that the only effective solution to consumer safety issues must be 
federal in its nature: “[w]e believe that the leadership in this effort to eliminate 
unreasonable hazards in the marketplace is appropriately and peculiarly a function of the 
Federal Government.”51
While the NCPS was conducting its research, the Nixon administration was also  
researching this issue and preparing its own proposed comprehensive approach to 
regulating consumer products.52  Soon thereafter, both the NCPS and the President 
submitted bills to Congress aimed at consolidating nearly all federal consumer product 
safety regulation53 under the umbrella of one entity.  Both bills proposed creating a  
comprehensive federal consumer safety regulation with one major exception:  the 
Commission’s bill sought to establish a new independent regulatory agency54 while the 
47 Id. at 6.
48
 Interestingly though, the NCPS was not entirely dismissive of any State role in consumer product 
regulation.  In fact, in its Final Report, the NCPS concluded that:
As State[s] and municipalities traditionally have served to adapt national programs to 
unusual local conditions, they have also been a source of original and innovative 
techniques and ideas in legislation... [t]hey provide an indispensable channel and source 
for the feedback of information about product safety and the effect of safety regulations.  
Id. at 51.
49 Id. at 39.
50 Id. at 52; To be fair though, the NCPS did envision a scheme in which those “State regulations that do 
not unduly burden interstate commerce ...” might be still be appropriate.  Id.
51 Id.
52
 S. 1797, 92nd Cong. (1972); H.R. 8110, 92nd Cong. (1972).
53
 While the CPSA was often called a “comprehensive” or “omnibus” consumer safety bill, several 
consumer products and activities did not (and still do not) fall within the scope of the CPSC.  Examples 
include the United States Coast Guard’s jurisdiction over consumer boat safety (14 U.S.C. § 2), the Food 
and Drug Administration’s jurisdiction over consumer drugs, food, cosmetics, and medical devices (21 
U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration over motor vehicles and tires 
(23 U.S.C. § 404), and the Federal Aviation Administration’s jurisdiction over aircraft (49 U.S.C. § 40101).
54
 S. 983, 92nd Cong. (1972); H.R. 8157, 92nd Cong. (1972).
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President’s bill sought to vest authority in a new entity within the existing Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare.55
The NCPS envisioned an independent agency that would be similar to the Federal 
Trade Commission in that it would not directly report to any Department or Cabinet 
office.56 It concluded that an independent agency was an absolute necessity because 
“[s]tatutory regulatory programs buried in agencies with broad and diverse missions 
have, with few exceptions, rarely fulfilled their mission.”57  This resulted from the fact 
that non-independent agencies inherently suffer inadequate staffing and funding because 
of competition for these limited resources within the umbrella agency.58
The Nixon administration, on the other hand, envisioned its proposed Consumer 
Safety Administration as essentially replacing the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare’s Food and Drug Administration with three distinct “offices”, namely, the Office 
of Product Safety Regulation, the Office of Food Regulation, and the Office of Drug 
Regulation.59 The administration aimed to take what it called the “next logical step” in 
consumer product safety regulation by establishing the “Government’s authority to take 
positive action in the interests of safety, when needed, across the full range of consumer 
products.”60  The administration bill provided for the promulgation of mandatory product 
safety standards, authority to conduct inspections, and a private right of action 
mechanism.61  In the end, the Nixon administration chose to pursue this goal through an 
existing department, rather than an independent agency, because it believed that “this 
important program can be most efficiently and effectively managed in a major 
department [the existing HEW] which has similar and complementary programs, 
supporting facilities and a high degree of visibility in the public eye.62
Ultimately, components of both approaches were melded into what was originally 
termed the Food, Drug and Consumer Product Agency but soon became known as the 
55
 S. 1797, 92nd Cong. (1972).
56
 S. 983, 92nd Cong. (1972); H.R. 8157, 92nd Cong. (1972).
57
 Hearing on National Commission On Product Safety Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong. 41 
(1970)(hearing and final report presented to the President and Congress). 
58 Id.
59
 The administration’s rationale for opposing the creation of a new independent agency was based upon the 
stated need to reduce the growing proliferation of such agencies at that time: 
Those who favor an independent agency do so in hopes that this will be useful in 
achieving our common goals—assuring visibility, public accountability, a quick start, and 
vigor for an important new program.  But this is not necessarily the best way to achieve 
these ends.  And it runs counter to a current need to consolidate, not proliferate, agencies.  
We all know that we cannot indefinitely proliferate agencies for a multitude of special 
needs.  The problem of proliferation of agencies has become acute.
The Consumer Product Safety Act:  Hearings on H.R. 8110, H.R. 8157, H.R. 260 (and additional bills), 
H.R. 3813 (and additional bills) Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce. & Finance of the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92nd Cong. 974, 977 (1971).
60 Id. at 977.
61 Id. at 970-976.
62 Id. at 977.  A detailed analysis of additional differences between the administration’s bill and the NCPS 
Commission bill is located in the Senate sub-committee hearing statement and testimony of Elliot 
Richardson, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, id. at 968-1057.
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Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”).63  The underlying idea was to create a 
new “super-agency” that would combine certain areas of regulatory authority previously 
exercised by the Food and Drug Administration, Center for Disease Control, Department 
of Commerce, Federal Trade Commission, Department of Agriculture and the former 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.64  Ultimately, Congress sought to 
establish “one agency with comprehensive jurisdiction and authority to regulate all food, 
drugs, and common household products.”65
The effort to establish an omnibus federal consumer safety regulation was finally 
completed when Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972 (“CPSA”) 
and President Nixon signed the bill into law.66   This Act created the CPSC, an 
independent federal agency with authority to exercise safety regulatory jurisdiction over 
nearly all consumer products and activities.67
3. The Crescendo of Federal Consumer Safety Regulatory Power: the 
Creation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission
In establishing the CPSC in 1972, Congress issued a series of findings that 
specifically set forth its rationale for exercising what was essentially a federal police 
power over issues of consumer safety.  Among other things, Congress specifically found 
that the states were not adequately regulating consumer safety: 
The Congress finds that
(1) an unacceptable number of consumer products which present 
unreasonable risks of injury are distributed in commerce;
63
 Possibly predicting these diverging approaches, legislation was at one point introduced that would have 
created both an independent agency called the Consumer Protection Agency and an executive branch office 
called the Office of Consumer Affairs. See H.R. 18214, 91st Cong. (1970).
64 See S. REP. NO. 92-749 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573, 4574.  
65 Id.  As clearly demonstrated by the Senate Commerce Committee report, the Committee contemplated 
the consumer product regulatory scope of this Act in terms of “household products”.  The use of this 
language seems to be an early indication that non-household products, such as amusement park attractions, 
were not originally envisioned as falling within the scope of this new “super-agency”.  In fact, the 
Committee report later reiterated the limited regulatory scope of this agency, at least in terms of consumer 
products, when it stated that, “new legislative authority is also necessary to cover the safety hazards posed 
by household products for which present law establishes no safety regulation.”  See S. REP. NO. 92-749 
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573, 4579 (emphasis added). Thus, the argument by those in 
favor of granting the CPSC jurisdiction over fixed-site park attractions, that Congress created a previously 
non-existent regulatory loophole for fixed-site park attractions by exempting them from the current scope 
of the CPSC’s jurisdiction seems to ignore the fact that the Senate itself originally provided the Federal 
government with regulatory authority only over “household products.”  
66
 Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1208, 2051 (1972).
67A detailed explanation of how Congress ultimately reconciled the differing approaches toward creating a 
new federal entity charged with a near comprehensive regulatory responsibility over consumer products can 
be found in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee on Conference for the CPSA (PL 92-573) 
located at H.R. REP. NO. 92-1593, at 32-56. 
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(2) complexities of consumer products and the diverse nature and abilities 
of consumers using them frequently result in an inability of users to 
anticipate risks and to safeguard themselves adequately;
(3) the public should be protected against unreasonable risks of injury 
associated with consumer products;
(4) control by State and local governments of unreasonable risks of injury 
associated with consumer products is inadequate and may be burdensome 
to manufacturers;
(5) existing Federal authority to protect consumers from exposure to 
consumer products presenting unreasonable risks of injury is inadequate; 
and
(6) regulation of consumer products the distribution or use of which 
affects interstate or foreign commerce is necessary to carry out this Act.68
After making these findings, Congress proceeded to identify the goals it sought to 
achieve by establishing the CPSC 
(1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated 
with consumer products;
(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer 
products;
(3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and to 
minimize conflicting State and local regulations; and
(4) to promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of 
product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.69
The CPSA provided the CPSC with two types of enforcement tools:  the ability to 
promulgate mandatory product safety standards and the ability to initiate product 
recalls.70  The mandatory standard provision was generally considered the more effective 
of the two because it allowed the CPSC to prevent products that did not meet the 
mandatory standard from even entering the marketplace.71  However, the CPSA required 
that the CPSC complete a detailed rule-making process before promulgating a mandatory 
standard.72  Consumers could also petition the CPSC for a specific product safety 
standard.73
The recall provision, on the other hand, allowed for swift and decisive action on a 
consumer product—but, by its very nature, only after the product had entered into the 
marketplace.  This presented the CPSC with a choice:  prioritize its own efforts on the 
more cumbersome mandatory standards approach of preventing dangerous consumer 
68
 Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 2, 86 Stat. 1208, 2051 (1972).
69 Id.





products from getting to market or prioritizing the less cumbersome recall approach of 
removing dangerous consumer products after they had entered the market.  Despite the 
incredible amount of research, study, and debate that ultimately went into creating it, the 
CPSC would soon find that its ability to accomplish these Congressionally-established 
goals was much less certain than expected.   
The first chairman of the CPSC, Richard Simpson, opted for the former approach 
and went so far as to promise that the CPSC would promulgate at least 100 new 
mandatory product safety standards within the CPSC’s first ten years.74  The problem this 
pledge faced was that it did not fully grasp the effect of also allowing consumers, as well 
as trade groups, corporations, or nearly any other type of entity, to petition the CPSC for 
mandatory safety standards.  This created a logjam of petitions which itself was 
compounded by the fact that, soon after its first day of business, the CPSC began to 
solicit petitions from consumers.75  The result was that the CPSC was quickly inundated 
with an unmanageable number of safety standard petitions that distracted the 
Commission from formulating any of its own product safety standards.76  In response, the 
CPSC tried different measures to enable it to begin establishing its own agenda (rather 
than simply responding to outside petitions); however, by 1976, Chairman Simpson 
acknowledged that up to 75 percent of the CPSC’s regulatory efforts were spent 
responding to petitions rather than creating its own mandatory standards or instituting its 
own recalls.77  In many ways, the CPSC’s aggressive attempt to respond to outside 
petitions, while still implementing its own internal safety priorities, created a “jack of all 
trades but a master of none” scenario.78
Despite facing a complete overload of its resources, the CPSC would soon decide 
that its regulatory scope allowed it to exercise nationwide jurisdiction over amusement 
parks, including those fixed to a specific site.  The CPSC made this decision despite the 
fact that, near this very time, the General Accounting Office had issued several reports 
and offered testimony before a Congressional oversight committee that was critical of the 
CPSC’s operations, including its overextension of resources: “the Commission needs to 
be selective in its enforcement and compliance activities and it certainly cannot cover the 
total universe on a 100-percent basis.”79
This decision to further expand its regulatory reach would only end up 
exacerbating the CPSC’s problems as it would now mean that the CPSC would have to 
travel throughout country inspecting the growing number of fixed-site amusement parks 
sprouting up from Los Angeles to Long Island—and all parts in between since, unlike 
household products (or, for that matter, nearly all other products that it regulated), fixed-
74
 E. Marla Felcher, The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission:  The Paper Tiger of American 
Product Safety, at http://www.understandinggovt.org/felcher.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
75 Id. at 4.
76 Id.  
77 Id.
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 During these early years, the CPSC also faced a variety of other problems including a series of General 
Accounting Office reports that the CPSC was wasting its resources.  Id. at 6.  These problems would serve 
as the seed for Congress’ eventual wholesale reevaluation of the CPSC as part of the 1981 Amendment 
which would clarify that fixed-site amusement parks did not fall within the CPSC’s regulatory jurisdiction.  
See Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 724 (1981).
79 To Aid in the Enforcement of Acts Implemented by the Consumer Product Safety Commission: Hearing 
Before the Sen. Commerce on Comm., 93rd Cong. 17 (Sept. 9, 1976)(statement of Gregory Ahart, Director 
Human Resources Division General Accounting Office).
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site amusement attractions could not be packaged up and shipped to a central CPSC 
testing facility for inspection and analysis.  By deciding to begin regulating fixed-site 
attractions, the CPSC would end up raising serious legal questions of not only could the it 
legally regulate such attractions but, in light of its limited budget and staffing, should it 
do so.  The stage was now set for the regulatory showdown over fixed-site attractions.
C. The Birth and Development of Fixed-Site Amusement Parks in the United 
States.
In 1894, what is generally considered the first modern day amusement park, 
“Water Chutes”, opened in Chicago.  In addition to being the first park to charge 
admission, Water Chutes was also the first park to use amusement rides as its primary 
guest attraction. The success of Water Chutes ultimately led to the opening of the famous 
Coney Island amusement park in New York.  Soon, this new form of entertainment found 
its way into communities throughout the country.80  In fact, by 1910, over 2000 
amusement parks were being operated within the United States.81
The number of amusement parks continued to gradually grow throughout the 
early 20th century with one historian identifying the 1920s as “the golden age of 
amusement parks.”82  However, by the end of that decade, the Great Depression had 
struck and the number of amusement parks had dwindled to around 400.83  The industry 
would make a comeback, however, because of the prosperity that many Americans 
encountered following World War II.84  This comeback too faced challenges though as 
more and more American families moved away from the cities--where many amusement 
parks were located--and into the suburbs.  While doing so, many of these families also 
began to find their main source of entertainment at home following their purchase of that 
new innovation known as the television.85
On July 17, 1955, a pivotal event in the history of amusement parks occurred with 
the opening of Disneyland in Anaheim, California.  Costing upwards of $17 million, 
Disneyland was designed as a variation of the traditional amusement park that had, until 
now, been centered around a midway.86  Instead of adhering to that traditional layout, 
Disneyland was centered around five “themed” lands—thus the creation of the term 
“theme park”.  In addition to being designed differently than any amusement park at the 
time, Disneyland also placed a unique emphasis on “ride safety” as being one of the key 
components to a successful park.  As one commentator has noted, “Disney saw his park 
80
 For a detailed historical review of how amusement parks have developed in the United States, I 
recommend JUDITH A. ADDAMS, THE AMERICAN AMUSEMENT PARK INDUSTRY:  A HISTORY OF 
TECHNOLOGY AND THRILLS (Twayne 1991); WILLIAM F. MANGELS, THE OUTDOOR AMUSEMENT 
INDUSTRY (VANTAGE 1952); AND DALE SAMUELSON, THE AMERICAN AMUSEMENT PARK (St. Paul 2001).
81 NATIONAL AMUSEMENT PARK HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, Great Moments, available at 
http://www.napha.org/moments.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
82 Id. at 2.
83 NATIONAL AMUSEMENT PARK HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, Industry History, available at 
http://www.napha.org/history.html  (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
84 Id. at 2.
85 Id. at 2.
86 NATIONAL AMUSEMENT PARK HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, Great Moments, p.3, available at 
http://www.napha.org/moments.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
18
as the future of entertainment and even as a model of cities to come: clean, efficient, safe, 
and controlled.”87
The incredible success of Disneyland ultimately led to large corporations such as 
Marriott Corporation, Anheuser-Busch, and Mattel entering the theme park field.88  This 
boom continued through the 1970s with the opening of Disney World in Orlando, Florida 
and into the 1980s and 1990s with the openings of various Sea World, Universal, and Six 
Flags theme parks as well as Epcot Center in Orlando, Florida—the first park to be built 
at a cost of over $1 billion dollars.89
In 2003, over 165 million people attended just the top fifty most-visited parks in 
the United States.90  In total, there are approximately 600 amusement and theme parks 
located in the United States.91  Not surprisingly, with this incredible growth, has come 
increased scrutiny.  In particular, a growing number of consumers, regulators, media, and 
researchers have increasingly asked the question: are the products of this industry that so 
many Americans enjoy every year really safe?  
The answer to this question serves as the crux of the debate regarding whether the 
federal government or the state governments should regulate the safety of fixed-site 
amusement and theme parks.  In fact, not long after the passage of the CPSA, the CPSC 
appeared to offer its own answer to this question when it attempted to usurp the 
traditional state authority over this regulatory area.  What followed was a debate that 
continues today, full of legal and legislative wranglings.
D. The CPSC’s Attempt at Exercising Safety Regulatory Jurisdiction Over 
Fixed-site attractions.
[Police Powers] form a portion of that immense mass of 
legislation which embraces everything within the territory 
of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all 
which can be most advantageously exercised by the States 
themselves.92
Traditionally, the CPSC has taken a very expansionist view regarding the scope of 
its regulatory authority to the point that it now regulates over 15,000 different products.93
When it comes to fixed-site amusement attractions, however, the CPSC has not always 
87
 Joshua Wolf Shenk, Hidden Kingdom: Disney’s Political Blueprint, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, March 
21, 1995, available at http://www.prospect.org/print/V6/21/shenk-j.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
88 NATIONAL AMUSEMENT PARK HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, Great Moments, p.3, available at 
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89 Id. at 3.
90 Mike Schneider, Amusement Park Attendance Slides, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, posted Dec. 20, 2003, 
available at http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/business/7536247.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
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been absolutely certain that these attractions fell within its regulatory jurisdiction.  In 
fact, a review of internal CPSC documents from the mid 1970s reveals that the CPSC’s 
very first steps into this area were trepiditious at best.
1. The CPSC’s Initial Steps Toward Exercising Jurisdiction Over Fixed-Site 
Amusement Parks.
One of the first documented internal CPSC discussions of this issue occurred in 
August 1974 when Robert W. McAfee, Acting Area Director for the CPSC’s Denver 
Area Office wrote to the CPSC’s Office of Field Coordination Director, Charles Boehne, 
inquiring whether amusement park rides actually fell within the CPSC’s jurisdiction.94
Less than ten days later, Mr. Boehne forwarded a memorandum with his office’s initial 
thoughts on Mr. McAfee’s inquiry to the CPSC General Counsel’s Office.  In this 
memorandum Mr. Boehne indicated that his office felt that strong arguments could be 
made both in favor of and against the CPSC asserting jurisdiction over amusement rides:  
Dave Wolfson tells me there is a clear case to argue against jurisdiction on 
the theory of assumption of risk.95  On the other side of the coin, we could 
say that the consumer is purchasing the ride, and the ride itself represents a 
consumer product; therefore the ride is subject to our jurisdiction.  From 
this position, we could argue that, as a consumer product, the ride would 
be subject to our jurisdiction if it presented an unreasonable source of risk 
to the consumer.96
In November of that same year, the CPSC General Counsel Office issued a 
memorandum in which it concluded that “amusement rides fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Commission, and are subject to regulation under the Consumer Product Safety Act.” 
97
  The OGC relied upon Section 3 (a)(1) of the CPSA which defined consumer products 
as: “any article or component part thereof, produced or distributed … (ii) for the personal 
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use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or temporary 
household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise …”  
Based upon this definition, the General Counsel’s Office reasoned that “[i]t can 
be said that consumers ‘use’ amusement rides when they ride on them … Since that use is 
considered ‘recreation’, amusement rides fall within the above statutory definition.”98
Interestingly, neither Mr. McAfee’s original letter nor Mr. Boehne’s subsequent 
memorandum—nor even the November response memorandum from the Commission’s 
General Counsel’s Office—made any distinction between whether the amusement rides 
were located in fixed-site parks or mobile parks.  Whether these individuals simply did 
not understand the potential significance of this distinction is unclear.  It does, however, 
seem to indicate that all of these individuals, including the Commission’s legal counsel, 
were evaluating this issue within the context of  statutory interpretation rather than a 
Constitutional question involving interstate commerce.99
2. The CPSC’s Initial Enforcement Actions
The CPSC’s internal conclusion that it maintained regulatory jurisdiction over 
amusement park rides was soon followed by the its first lawsuit seeking to enjoin the 
operation of a specific ride.  In CPSC v. Chance Manufacturing Co., Inc.100, the CPSC 
sued the manufacturer and distributor of the “Zipper”—an amusement ride in which 
guests were placed in vehicles seating two or three persons and then rotated on a 360 
degree arc.101  This lawsuit was preceded by a news release from the CPSC which 
contained an “urgent warning” for consumers to avoid riding the Zipper following four 
fatalities and two serious injuries suffered after a door latch allegedly malfunctioned 
causing riders to be ejected from the ride vehicle.102
In the lawsuit, the CPSC first alleged that the Zipper was a consumer product 
subject to its regulatory jurisdiction.103 The CPSC then alleged that the operation of this 
consumer product should be enjoined because it constituted an “imminently hazardous 
consumer product” which, pursuant to Section 12(b)(1) of the CPSA was subject to 
temporary and permanent relief (in this case the CPSC sought a preliminary 
injunction).104  The manufacturer of the Zipper and the defendant responded by seeking 
the dismissal of the lawsuit on the ground that the Zipper did not fall within the definition 
98 Id.
99
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of a “consumer product” under the CPSA and, therefore, did not fall within the CPSC’s 
jurisdiction.105
While recognizing the “closeness” of the issue and that its decision rested on 
“narrow grounds”, the court ultimately held that the Zipper was a “consumer product” 
and thus subject to CPSC jurisdiction.106  In making this decision, the court looked to the 
CPSC’s definition of “consumer product”:
any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed (i) for sale 
to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or temporary household or 
residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise, or (ii) for the personal use, 
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around a permanent or 
temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise 
...
107
After reviewing this definition, the court agreed that the Zipper did not fall within 
Part (i) of the same definition since the ride was not sold directly to consumers.108
However, contrary to the defendant’s primary argument, the court found that the Zipper 
did fall within Part (ii) of the definition because it was produced and distributed for the 
personal use and enjoyment of the consumer in recreation.109  Notably, because it 
concluded that the “consumer product” definition itself was ambiguous, the court opted 
to rely upon its interpretation of various legislative history sources as a basis for this 
finding.110  In particular, the court found especially persuasive the fact that: “[t]he most 
unequivocal expression of congressional intent to be gleaned from the legislative history 
of the Act is that the definition of “consumer product” be construed broadly to advance 
the Act’s articulated purpose of protecting consumers from hazardous products.”111
From here, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Zipper could not 
be a “consumer product” because the rider had no possessory interest over the ride and, 
instead, maintained at most “an abstract right to occupy an amusement device.”112  In 
other words, the defendant essentially argued that a product could only be a consumer
product if the consumer could maintain some control over the product.  However, the 
court found that this element of “control” was not actually required by the definition at 
issue and, in making this finding, ultimately concluded that “personal use, consumption 
or enjoyment” can exist absent any control or possession by the consumer.113
Essentially, the Chance matter revolved around the issue of statutory 
interpretation and did not address the legal appropriateness of the statute itself.  In fact, 
not a single word of dicta is given to the issue of whether the federal government even 
had a right to regulate products, such as amusement rides, that had traditionally been 
105 Id.
106 Id. at 233.
107
 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1).
108
 441 F.Supp. at 231.
109 Id. at 233.
110 Id. at 231-232.
111 Id. at 231.
112 Id. at 232, citing Albert v. State, 80 Misc.2d 105, 362 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (1974).
113
 441 F.Supp. at 233.
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governed by the states—this despite the fact that the issue of what fell within the scope of 
the Commerce Clause remained a pressing discussion among the courts at the time.114
The fact that neither the defendant nor the court even considered the interstate 
commerce implications of federalizing amusement park safety regulations seems further 
indicative of the fact that the federal right to regulate this area is not contingent or based 
upon the Commerce Clause.  Rather, the federal government’s ability to enter this field of 
regulation could be premised on the fact that, as a sovereign governmental entity (like the 
states), it too possesses an inherent right to protect the safety of its citizens through police 
powers.115  Regardless of the answer to the question of whether the federal government 
does maintain an inherent police power, even if the defendant had prevailed in Chance, 
the victory could have been short-lived as Congress could simply have chosen to revise 
the definition of “consumer product” to include amusement rides.  
As the following discussion on the current legislative efforts to federalize fixed-
site amusement park safety regulation will show, this point is very important because it 
helps clarify that the real underlying issue is not whether the federal government can
regulate amusement rides but whether it should do so (or, conversely, whether it should 
yield to the states on this issue).  In the case of amusement rides, the facts clearly 
demonstrate that the CPSC ignored the propriety of its entering this regulatory field and, 
instead, opted to bull-headedly charge into this matter with little, if any, consideration 
about the effects—or even the need—for it to do so.
Apparently emboldened by its relative success in the Chance matter, the CPSC 
quickly entered into a series of additional lawsuits in its increased efforts to regulate 
amusement rides.  One such example was the CPSC’s announcement on August 29, 1980 
that it had contemporaneously filed a formal complaint against the State Fair of Texas 
arising from a fatal accident on that park’s “Skyride” as well as two other complaints 
against the Marriott Corporation relating to two of its “Great America” parks located in 
Santa Clara, California and Gurnee, Illinois.116  The CPSC’s simultaneous filing of these 
complaints represented the largest regulatory effort to date against fixed-site attractions 
and set the stage for the political and legal fights that would finally answer the question 
of whether the CPSA provided the CPSC with regulatory authority over amusement 
attractions in fixed-site parks. 
114
 Around this very time, various interests were hotly debating the scope of the federal government’s 
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.  After various courts disagreed as to the allowed scope that 
the Commerce Clause created, the Court addressed this issue, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976) which itself was later overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority¸469 
U.S. 528 (1985)—generally considered to be the current state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
115 See discussion infra section II.A.
116
 Press Release, United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, Commission Files Complaints 
Following Fatal Accidents On Amusement Park Rides (Aug. 29,1980), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml80/80032.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004). The CPSC and 
Marriott settled this complaint on January 27, 1981 after Marriott made certain ride modifications, and 
agreed to both pay a civil penalty of $70,000.00 and comply with certain CPSC accident reporting 
requirements.  Marriott entered into this settlement without conceding that the incidents in question were 
within the CPSC’s jurisdiction. Press Release, United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
Commission Announces Settlement Of Civil Penalty Action Involving Amusement Rides (Jan. 27, 1981), 
available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml81/81004.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2004).
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The allegations against Marriott involved a roller-coaster operating under the 
name of “Willard’s Whizzer”.117  In particular, the CPSC alleged that Marriott failed to 
report several incidents in which the braking mechanism on this ride failed to properly 
engage, thus causing serious rider injuries—including an incident on March 29, 1980 in 
which a thirteen-year-old child was killed on the ride at Marriott’s Santa Clara park.118
In The State Fair of Texas v. United States Consumer Products Safety 
Commission,119 the plaintiff sought to quash an administrative warrant by the CPSC 
seeking to inspect the “Swiss Skyride”120 located at the Texas State Fair.  The CPSC 
sought the warrant following two separate accidents involving the Swiss Skyride in 
which several of the gondolas collided, resulting in various injuries and the death of one 
person.121
In determining whether or not to quash the warrant, the trial court identified two 
issues which must first be answered:  1) was the Swiss Skyride a “consumer product” and 
2) if so, did the CPSC have authority to inspect the Swiss Skyride located on the premises 
of the Texas State Fair?122  As to the first issue, the court looked to the Chance decision 
as support in holding that the Swiss Skyride was a “consumer product” because it was 
produced for the “personal use, consumption and enjoyment” of consumers.123  The court 
relied upon either legislative history or its own statutory interpretation to dismiss the 
Texas State Fair’s following five primary arguments offered against defining the Swiss 
Skyride as a consumer product:
1. The Swiss Skyride was not intended as a form of consumer 
recreation or enjoyment;124
2. The definition of “consumer product” only includes household 
products and, by its very size and nature, the Swiss Skyride is not a 
household product;125
117
 CPSC Complaint against Marriott Corporation, 45 Fed. Reg. 70964 (U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety 
Comm’n Oct. 16, 1980). 
118 Id.
119 The State Fair of Texas v. United States Consumer Products Safety Commission, 481 F.Supp. 1070 
(N.D. Tex. 1979).  The Texas State Fair is identified as the plaintiff in this matter because, technically, it 
filed suit to quash the administrative warrant filed against it by the CPSC.  Id. at 1073.
120
 The Swiss Skyride was an attraction in which guests traveled between two fixed points in gondolas 
attached to an overhead cable. While these rides were popular in previous generations, they are not 
currently as widespread as they once were.
121
  The Texas accident occurred when four gondolas fell to the ground after colliding mid-air. While only 
one passenger was killed in Texas, a similar accident caused three deaths in Missouri soon after. Following 
the accident at the state fair Swiss Skyride, state fair officials apparently permitted a CPSC engineer to 
observe the ride at a distance but would not allow the engineer to inspect the actual ride.  See The State Fair 
of Texas v. United States CPSC, 650 F.2d 1324, 1326 (5th Cir. 1981).
122
 481 F.Supp. at 1076.
123 Id. at 1077.
124
 The court rejected this argument by concluding that “[i]t can hardly be maintained that aerial tramways 
are produced for any reason but for the use or enjoyment of a consumer:  the ride is simply not an industrial 
product.”  Id. at 1077-1078.
125
 The court rejected this argument as a matter of statutory interpretation by concluding that the 
definition’s use of the term ‘in recreation’ was an independent basis for jurisdiction rather than simply a 
modifier of the terms in or around a “household”,  “residence”, or “school”.  Id. at 1077.
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3. The definition of “consumer product” requires the consumer to 
have a level of “personal” control over a product for it to fall within said 
definition;126
4. The Swiss Skyride is not a “consumer product” because it is not 
sold directly to consumers;127
5. The definition of “consumer product” requires that the CPSC be 
able to obtain a free “sample” of a product or purchase a product at cost—
neither of which requirements are practicable for the Swiss Skyride.128
After concluding that the Swiss Skyride was indeed a “consumer product”, the 
court considered whether the CPSA authorized the CPSC to enter the state fairgrounds to 
inspect the Swiss Skyride located there.  On this issue, the court concluded that the CPSC 
had not yet satisfied the statutory requirements necessary in order to obtain a warrant to 
enter the Texas State Fair property.129   The court based this ruling on the fact that 
Section 2065(a) of the CPSA limits the CPSC inspection jurisdiction to “any factory, 
warehouse, or establishment in which consumer products are manufactured or held, in 
connection with distribution in commerce.”130  In light of this requirement, the court 
concluded that the CPSC had not established that the Texas State Fair fell within the 
scope of these limits and, therefore, the CPSC could not enter and inspect because the 
“multitudinous facets of the right to be let alone are not merely classroom ideals but are 
core constitutional concepts.”131
The end result was that the trial court agreed with the CPSC that the Swiss 
Skyride was a “consumer product” but disagreed that the CPSC had the authority to enter 
the state fairgrounds to inspect this consumer product.  Unfortunately for the Texas State 
Fair, this “procedural” victory was to be short-lived as the Fifth Circuit would soon 
demonstrate.
Both sides appealed the trial court’s judgment; the Texas State Fair appealed the 
ruling that the Swiss Skyride was a “consumer product” and the CPSC appealed the 
ruling that it did not have authority to enter the state fairgrounds to inspect the Swiss 
Skyride.132 In a split decision, the majority upheld the trial court’s ruling that the Swiss 
Skyride was a “consumer product” and overturned the trial court’s ruling that the CPSC 
had not established any basis by which it was authorized to enter the state fairgrounds to 
inspect the Swiss Skyride.133   In particular, the circuit court found that the trial court’s 
126
 The court rejected this argument for essentially the same reasons that the Chance court rejected this 
argument. Id. at 1077-1078.
127
 The court rejected this argument because it failed to consider Section (ii) of the “consumer product” 
definition that provided “production for consumer” use as an alternative to Section (i)’s production for 
consumer sale option. Id. at 1078.
128
 This argument is the only one that the court considered “forceful” in any respect.  Even so, the court 
ultimately dismissed this argument too by finding that “[a]ny inconsistency is peripheral at best because 
there is nothing in the idea that the Commission is authorized to obtain samples that leads one to the 
conclusion that where it is impractical to do so, no right of inspection was intended.  The Commission is 
authorized, not required to, sample.” Id.
129 Id. at 1082. 
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 15 U.S.C. § 2065(a).
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 481 F.Supp. at 1081.
132 The State Fair of Texas v. United States CPSC, 650 F.2d 1324, 1325 (5th Cir. 1981).
133 Id.
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interpretation of where a consumer product could be inspected was too narrow because 
the Skyride was indeed “assembled” at the Texas State Fair.134  The court based this 
finding on what it perceived to be the impractical consequences of the trial court’s ruling: 
“[w]henever a product can be assembled only on the purchaser’s site, the Commission 
must either have the authority to inspect the functioning product there or be in most 
circumstances unable to inspect it at all.”135
On the issue of whether the Swiss Skyride was a “consumer product”, the 
majority opinion essentially adopted the reasoning of the trial court in rejecting the Texas 
State Fair’s arguments.  The result is that, like Chance, this case was ultimately decided 
by statutory interpretation and legislative histories findings.  In other words, the parties 
continued to approach the issue from an angle of “can the CPSC” instead of “should the 
CPSC”.136  While the Chance and State Fair of Texas decisions seemed to demonstrate a 
trend toward defining amusement rides as “consumer products”, two other cases were 
working themselves through the courts and would ultimately hold just the opposite.
On April 17, 1979—roughly eight months before the trial court’s ruling in the 
State Fair of Texas case—a federal court in California issued the first opinion holding 
that amusement rides did not fall within in the CPSA’s definition of “consumer product”.  
Walt Disney Productions v. United States CPSC137 also involved an attempt by the CPSC 
to inspect other Skyride-like attractions—in this case at the Disneyland park in Anaheim, 
California and at the Walt Disney World park in Lake Buena Vista, Florida.  This dispute 
began, on December 5, 1978, when the CPSC sent letters to Disney announcing that it 
was opening an investigation into Skyrides and that Disney must provide the CPSC 
certain information regarding its Skyrides pursuant to this investigation.138
In response to these letters, Disney sought declaratory relief from the court in the 
form of a judgment that these Skyrides did not fall within the CPSA’s definition of 
“consumer product”.   The court granted such relief after concluding that the rides at 
issue are not “consumer products” because “the Act and its history supports an 
interpretation limiting the term ‘consumer product’ to products that might customarily be 
owned and/or operated by consumers.”139  In particular, the court concluded that:
When a customer at Disneyland or Walt Disney World purchases a ride on 
a Skyride, he or she purchases only the right to occupy the installation 
134 Id. at 1334.
135 Id.
136In fact, of these two matters, the only mention of the propriety of the CPSC attempts to federalize 
amusement park regulation occurs in a footnote of the dissenting opinion in the State Fair of Texas matter.  
In that note, the dissent concluded its opinion by pointing out that, even if the definition of “consumer
product” was interpreted to exclude amusement rides from the CPSC’s jurisdiction, the exclusion would 
not expose riders to unregulated safety risks:  “[t]here is no absence of governmental regulation of the State 
Fair grounds.  Safety of the buildings and structure has been provided for since 1941 under the Dallas City 
Code.”  Id. at 1336.  Based upon this fact, one might reasonably argue that the safety of amusement riders 
at the State Fair would be better regulated by the entity which had been doing so for nearly 30 years (the 
City of Dallas) rather than the CPSC who—at that time—had just started regulating fixed-site park 
attractions.  
137 Walt Disney Productions v. United States CPSC, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996 (C.D. Cal. April 17, 
1979)(rev'd on other grounds, No. 80-1006 (9th Cir. May 4, 1981)).
138 Id. at 4-5.
139 Id. at 7.
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passively.  The only ‘consumer product’ purchased is the [ride] ticket.  
The ride apparatus as a whole is not produced ‘for the personal use, 
consumption or enjoyment of a consumer...so it is not a consumer 
product.140
As part of this holding, the court deftly addressed not only whether the CPSC can 
regulate amusement rides, but also whether it should: “[t]oo expansive a reading of the 
Act’s definition of a ‘consumer product’ could result in the Commission spreading [its] 
limited resources too thinly, and might rob consumers of the specialized agency expertise 
that Congress has attempted to guarantee.141
While this decision was ultimately reversed on other grounds142, this ruling 
provided an important glimpse into the critical question of whether the CPSC’s entry into
the field of amusement park safety regulation might actually end up decreasing overall 
safety in the amusement industry by replacing existing state regulatory mechanisms with 
the CPSC’s nascent fixed-site attraction regulatory effort.  Notably, the Disney case was 
not the only decision to conclude that amusement rides were not “consumer products” 
though.  In fact, early the next year, a decision would be issued which would ultimately 
place two federal circuits at odds on this matter.  
In Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,143 an 
amusement park operator again brought an action for declaratory relief against the CPSC 
following the Commission’s attempt to obtain information concerning another skyride-
type attraction—this time located at the Tulsa, Oklahoma State Fairgrounds.144  The 
declaratory relief action sought a judgment that the CPSC did not have jurisdiction over 
amusement rides at the Oklahoma State Fair.145  Similar to the plaintiffs in the State Fair 
of Texas and Disney matters, the plaintiff in this case argued that the skyride at issue did 
not fall within the definition of “consumer product” and, in doing so, basically adopted 
the same arguments relied upon by the plaintiff in State Fair of Texas matter.146
And, just as the Bell plaintiff used similar arguments as the State Fair of Texas
plaintiff, the trial court in Bell reached a similar conclusion as the trial court in State Fair 
of Texas when it concluded that the skyride at issue did indeed fall within the definition 
of “consumer product”.147  In opting to agree with the State Fair of Texas court rather 
than the Disney court, this court noted the “minimal consideration of legislative history in 
Disney compared to that in Chance” and, as a result, decided that: “this Court will follow 
140 Id. at 7-8 (citation omitted).
141 Id. at 8.
142 See infra note 136.
143 Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 484 F.Supp. 1221 (N.D.Ok. 
1980).
144 Id. at 1222.
145 Id.
146
 In particular, the plaintiff focused on how the CPSC could not obtain “free samples” of the skyride and 
how Congress had couched much of the debate involving the original passage of the CPSA in terms of 
regulating “household products”.  Id. at 1222, 1223.  The plaintiff also argued that the skyride was a 
transportation device, rather than a consumer product, and therefore did not fall within the CPSC’s 
jurisdiction.  Id.  
147 Id. at 1223.
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the apparently more thoroughly researched and better-reasoned decision in Chance, 
supported by the decision in State Fair.”148
However, the similarity between the trial courts’ findings in Bell and State Fair of 
Texas, did not extend to the appellate courts’ conclusions in those matters.  Where the 
Fifth Circuit agreed with its trial court that an amusement attraction fell within the 
CPSA’s definition of “consumer product”, the Tenth Circuit overturned the Bell trial 
court’s ruling of the same.149
Up until then, all of the decisions on this issue had agreed that amusement rides 
did not fall within the scope of the CPSA’s subsection (i) definition of “consumer 
product” because the Skyrides were obviously not produced or distributed “for sale” to 
consumers as is required by that subsection.150  The primary debate was whether the same 
rides fell within subsection (ii)’s “for personal use” language.  Until the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision in Bell, the courts appeared to make the assumption that the purpose of 
subsection (ii) was to enlarge the scope of what products constituted “consumer 
products”.  In Bell, the Tenth Circuit rejected that conclusion. 
Instead, the Tenth Circuit concluded that subsection (ii) was created only to 
ensure that all manners of product distribution were covered by the CPSA--beyond 
simply Section (i)’s inclusion of products that were sold to consumers.151  Thus, 
subsection (ii) served the purpose of also including within the CPSA products that were 
leased to consumer, given as samples to consumers, or otherwise provided to consumers 
by means different from a sale and consumer purchase:
Then with the concern over distribution to consumers of articles as free 
samples, on approval, on lease, on loan, etc., the second clause (ii) was 
added.  This was added to include distribution to consumers of the same 
things but without a sale, and thereby to include articles produced or 
distributed ‘for personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer.’  
This with (i) was to cover all types of distribution.152
The Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that subsection (ii) “was added to cover all 
manner of distribution and for this alone,”153 led to its holding that amusement attractions 
did not fall within the CPSA’s definition of “consumer product” and, therefore, did not 
148 Id. at 1226.  The plaintiff in Bell also argued that the CPSA’s provision allowing the CPSC to enter 
certain premises to inspect consumer products violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against certain 
search and seizures since the CPSA provision permitted the CPSC to inspect some records without a search 
warrant.  Id. at 1222.  The court rejected this argument by finding  “no abusive process” or 
“unconstitutional encroachment on plaintiff’s privacy” resulting from the CPSA’s inspection provisions.
149 Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 645 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1981).
150
 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (a)(1).
151
 645 F.2d at 29.
152 Id. at 28;  see also Consumer Product Safety Commission v. Anaconda Co., 593 F.2d 1314, 1320 
(D.C.Cir. 1979)(“The legislative history reveals that clause (ii) was intended to complement clause (i) by 
reaching situations in which a consumer acquires the use of a product other than through a direct sale 
transaction…[t]ogether, clauses (i) and (ii) were designed to ensure that the definition of consumer product 
would encompass the various modes of distribution through which consumers acquire products and are 
exposed to the risks of injury associated with those products”).
153 Id.
28
fall within the CPSC’s jurisdiction.154  The result of this decision was that the Fifth 
Circuit and Tenth Circuit had now issued conflicting opinions (both of which were 
majority 2 to 1 decisions) regarding the identical issue (whether an amusement ride falls 
within the CPSA’s definition of “consumer product”) and, remarkably, involving the 
same type of amusement ride (a gondola-like skyride) located at similar venues (state 
fairgrounds).  Obviously, this matter was ripe for Supreme Court review and, indeed, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in State Fair of Texas.155
However, this hardly constituted a “traditional” grant of certiorari for, in the very 
same order, the Court also vacated the State Fair of Texas judgment and remanded the 
entire matter back to the trial court “with directions to dismiss as moot.”156  What caused 
this strange procedural posture where a case was simultaneously granted certiorari and 
mooted?  The simple answer is: a 1981 Congressional amendment to the CPSA that 
occurred during the very pendency of this appeal and that finally answered the issue of 
whether amusement attractions fall within the CPSA’s definition of “consumer product”.  
Quite simply, rather than let the judicial branch attempt to divine the scope of the CPSA’s 
“consumer product” definition, the 1981 amendment swiftly and precisely clarified that 
amusement attractions located at fixed sites do not fall within the CPSC’s jurisdiction 
and, thus, are not subject to regulation or inspection by it.157  However, while this 
154 Id. at 30.  While the most prominently discussed reason for its holding was the conclusion that Section 
(ii) did not simply an expand the reach of Section (i) but instead addressed entirely different modes of 
distribution, the court cited three other arguments. Those arguments included what weight should be given 
to the distinction between where a product is used and why a product is used; whether the product was 
normally produced or distributed “for sale to consumers or for the use of consumers”; and whether a 
product must be under both the control and possession of the user. Id. at 29-30.
155 State Fair of Texas v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 454 U.S. 1026 (1981).
156 Id.
157
 Significantly, this amendment did not address amusement rides operated in mobile venues such as 
traveling carnivals.  In fact, even after 1981, the CPSC has continued to issue safety warnings regarding 
“mobile” amusement rides.  Examples include the CPSC’s investigation and eventual settlement with 
operators of the mobile version of the “Enterprise” amusement ride following an October 17, 1983 incident 
at the Texas State Fair.  See Press Release, United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC 
Issues Alert on Amusement Park Ride (Nov. 1983), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml83/83056.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). As opposed to the 
Swiss Skyride which was the subject of the earlier litigation, the Enterprise was a mobile ride that was not 
affixed to the state fairgrounds.  See also Press Release, United States Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, CPSC Announces Corrective Action Plan for Popular “Enterprise” Amusement Park Ride 
(May 10, 1984), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml84/84031.html (last visited Feb. 
21, 2004)(detailing the corrective action plan entered into between the CPSC and the owners of mobile 
versions of the Enterprise ride).  
Another example involved a CPSC safety bulletin issued for the “Monster” amusement ride 
following at November 1988 incident in which one person was killed and six others were injured on a 
mobile version of that ride located at the Broward County, Florida Fair.  See Press Release, United States 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC Wants “Monster” Ride Inspected for Defects (Dec. 28, 
1998), available at http://www.cpsc.gov./cpscpub/prerel/prhtml88/88116.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2004). 
Especially interesting about this bulletin was the fact that, even though it acknowledged that the CPSC has 
no jurisdiction over versions of the “Monster” ride situated at fixed locations, the bulletin was nevertheless 
sent to owners of both the mobile and fixed versions of the ride “in an effort to ensure total ride safety.”  Id. 
This represents a great example of how the CPSC can still provide a valuable service to fixed-site 
amusement rides even in the absence of regulatory jurisdiction.
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amendment promptly mooted the legal disputes over this issue, it hardly created peace in 
the valley.  In fact, the fervor enveloping these legal disputes would pale in comparison 
to the legislative and political uproar that this amendment would end up causing in 
Congress.
3. 1981 Amendment to the Consumer Product Safety Act
As with other agencies, Congress must periodically reauthorize the CPSC in order 
to continue its existence.  The decision to reauthorize an agency is generally preceded by
hearings regarding the continued necessity and viability of that agency.  While these 
hearings are often replete with hard questions and the occasioned political grandstanding, 
the vast majority normally result in Congress reauthorizing the agency.  However, 
normality was nearly the exception in 1981 when the CPSC, faced with criticism from 
industry and consumer groups alike came within one vote before the Health and 
Environment Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce of being 
effectively abolished as an independent agency.  
One of the major resulting changes was that Congress implemented several new 
procedures that forced the CPSC to, among other things, work with industries to establish 
voluntary standards before it promulgated mandatory standards.158  Another less 
comprehensive, but equally notable, change was the clarification that amusement rides at 
fixed-site theme parks did not fall within the CPSC’s regulatory jurisdiction.159  These 
changes would allow states to exercise their traditional police power over safety issues 
while simultaneously allowing the CPSC to conserve the funds and manpower that would 
have been necessary for a nationwide regulatory effort of fixed-site amusement parks.160
While it survived the 1981 oversight hearings, the CPSC’s budget was cut 26 
percent and required to enact certain reforms.161  In addition to the large budget cut, one 
of the major 1981 Congressional mandates was a required focus on voluntary, rather than 
mandatory, standards.162  The result of these reforms was: “to require the Commission to 
Finally, as recently as 1999, the CPSC issued a safety bulletin for the “Himalaya” amusement ride.  
See Press Release, United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, CPSC, Reverchon Industries 
Announce Repair Program for Himalaya Amusement Rides (Mar. 23, 1999), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml99/99083.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004). This bulletin arose 
out of a series of incidents on this ride, including one in which three riders in Austin, Texas were ejected 
from their ride vehicle resulting in two serious injuries and one death.  As with the “Monster” bulletin, the 
CPSC exercised its jurisdiction over mobile versions of the ride and also notified state safety inspectors of 
this potential problem with fixed-site versions.
158
 Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 724 (1981).
159 Id.
160
 Admittedly, several individuals involved in the debate of the 1981 Amendment suggested that ulterior 
motives were the actual reason for its passage.  One such individual was a former CPSC investigator, 
Albert Limberg, who argued that Congress actually passed the 1981 Amendment in an attempt to shield 
large, corporate-owned parks, such as Marriott’s Great America in Santa Clara, California, from CPSC 
investigation and punishment.  See Suzanne Espinosa Solis, Lack of Theme Park Safety Rules Troubles 
Legislators, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, June 21, 1997, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/1997/06/21/MN60781.DTL#sections.
161 H.R. REP. NO. 97-208, at 1 (1981).
162 S. REP. NO. 97-102, at 4 (1981). Congress’ desire for the CPSC to focus on voluntary standards rather 
than mandatory standards was nothing new to the CPSC.  Apparently though, Congress had found the 
CPSC’s earlier response on this issue to be insufficient:
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rely more on industry self-regulation to eliminate needless overregulation and to take a 
closer look at its regulatory priorities in deciding how best to carry out its statutory 
mandate.”163
In order to accomplish the Congressional mandates of the 1981 Amendment, the 
CPSC recognized that, based upon its reduced funding and manpower, it must “manage 
[its] resources more efficiently” and place “an increased emphasis on cooperation among 
government, industry, and consumers.”164  To do so, the CPSC would have to 
dramatically revise its method of operation.  Among other things, these changes included 
an elimination of the Directorate of Field Operations, a reduction of field offices from 13 
to 5, and an overall reduction in travel funds.165
These internal changes not only a reduced the CPSC’s operating expenses, they 
also highlighted the practicality of another reform initiated by the 1981 Amendment:  the 
clarification that fixed-site amusement parks were not included within the CPSA’s 
definition of “consumer product”.166  The goal of this reform was to encourage states to 
“assume greater responsibility for the safety of amusement rides located at permanent 
sites.167  At first glance, the proposition of keeping fixed-site amusement attraction 
regulation within the states’ province seemed like a strong idea because of the practical 
budgetary problems faced by the CPSC as well as the theoretical federalism issues 
involved in the federal government usurping an area of traditional police power.  
However, as with many things, looks can be either deceiving or, at least, perceived to be 
deceiving.  Such was the case as this issue entered the often-curious world of 
Congressional debate.
4. The Continued Battles in Congress Over the 1981 Amendment: 1983-1988
Many witnesses testified that the Commission has failed to encourage or support 
voluntary efforts by industry members to improve product safety.  In addition, many 
believe that the Commission has overused mandatory product safety standards and bans 
as compared with less intrusive alternatives such as voluntary industry standards and 
requirements for warning labels or instructional materials for consumer information. 
Id. at 2. The result of this insufficient response was Congress’ inclusion in the 1981 
Amendment language that required the CPSC to first rely upon voluntary product 
standards when practicably possible.  See infra note 158.
163 Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce. Science, and 
Transportation, 97th Cong. 1 (1981)(statement of Sen. Robert W. Kasten, Jr.)
164 Id. at 2. In fact, at the time, one CPSC commissioner describing the effect of the 1981 Amendment on 
the CPSC said, “[w]e have suffered a hurt.  We have suffered a wound.  We have suffered a debilitating 
blow...the monitoring agency that they expect is out there looking into the safety of these products is not 
going to be able to perform in the way it has in the past”.  Id. at 11.
165 Id. at 3. 
166 S. REP. NO. 97-102, at 5 (1981). “Such term includes any mechanical device which carries or conveys 
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who is employed for that purpose and who is not a consumer with respect to such device, and which is not 
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Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1213, 95 Stat. 724 (1981).
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Despite the passage of the 1981 Amendment, some legislators still felt strongly 
that Congress should assign regulatory authority over fixed-site amusement parks to the 
CPSC. As a result, beginning with the very next session, Congressmen introduced a 
number of bills with the intent of accomplishing that goal.
a. 1983—1988
The ink on the 1981 Amendment had hardly had time to dry by the time several 
Congressman introduced a new bill titled the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1983.  
This bill sought in part to provide the CPSC with regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site 
amusement parks.168  While not allowing the CPSC to utilize all of its statutory tools 
(such as the promulgation of mandatory product standards) in regulating fixed-site 
attractions, this bill did seek to permit the CPSC to 1) collect amusement ride 
information, 2) investigate amusement ride accidents, and 3) order corrective actions for 
certain amusement rides.169
As grounds for this quick reversal of the 1981 Amendment, the bill’s proponents 
argued that the states had not adequately acted to institute amusement park safety laws in 
light of the 1981 Amendment.170  Moreover, even in those states that had promulgated 
fixed-site attraction safety regulations, those regulations were “uneven and 
inconsistent.”171  The bill’s proponents went so far as to claim that:
[t]he committee has reviewed the agency’s technical capability to assume 
this task and believes it has the technical expertise necessary to discharge 
the responsibilities authorized by this section.  [The] CPSC has a technical 
staff with expertise in the fields of mechanical, electrical and structural 
engineering and a staff of field personnel trained in investigative 
procedures.172
In fact, the supporters of the bill went even farther and suggested that the CPSC 
should also carefully monitor the State’s own amusement park safety enforcement 
efforts.173  Somewhat curiously though, the bill’s proponents expected the CPSC to do all 
of this despite the fact that the CPSC had just eliminated half of its field offices addition 
to drastically cutting its travel funding and budget in general.
This apparent contradiction did not fall on deaf ears in Congress.  In fact, the 
House Report on this bill contains the views of several Congressman who recognized the 
financial imprudence of giving an agency such as the CPSC, which had just undergone 
severe budget cuts, even more regulatory responsibility.174  The impractical and ill-
prepared nature of this immediate attempt to rescind the 1981 Amendment on this issue 
was summarized by the dissenting views to this bill:
168
 H.R. 2668, 98th Cong. (1983).
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This amendment, unwisely in our view, reverses action taken by Congress 
in 1981 denying the CPSC jurisdiction over fixed-site amusement parks.  
At that time, Congress was persuaded that the States can sufficiently 
regulate such parks and that the Commission is ill-equipped to so regulate.  
We are unaware of any facts that have occurred in the last 2 years which 
would lead us to conclude that a change in the present law is warranted.175
While the bill did pass out of committee, the committee’s dissenting view 
ultimately prevailed and the bill was defeated.  However, the effort to reverse the 1981 
Amendment would not end with that defeat for, on June 6, 1984 Representative Paul 
Simon of Illinois introduced the Amusement Park Safety Act of 1984.176  This bill sought 
to permit (but not require) the CPSC to inspect fixed-site amusement parks in states 
without existing regulations or, in the case of a fatality or personal injury requiring 
hospitalization, any state regardless of whether it had legislation in place. 
Representative Simon’s interest in this issue was piqued following several 
amusement park incidents at parks located in Illinois, including a May 22, 1984 incident 
at the Great America amusement park in Gurnee, Illinois where three riders were injured 
after falling 60 feet to the ground while their ride vehicle was ascending the attraction.177
This bill passed the House of Representatives but failed to pass out of committee in the 
Senate.178  Later that year, Congressman Simon was elected to one of Illinois’ United 
States Senate seats.  And, with him to the Senate, went his efforts to federalize fixed-site 
amusement park safety regulation.
On March 20, 1985, now-Senator Paul Simon introduced the Amusement Park 
Safety Act.179  This bill, supported by three of the major consumer groups at the time180, 
sought to empower the CPSC to regulate fixed site amusement parks in those states (26 at 
the time181) that had not passed state regulations.182  This bill also sought to grant the 
CPSC authority to investigate any serious accident or fatality—again regardless of 
whether the state in which the incident occurred had passed legislation governing fixed-
site amusement parks.183  In essence, this bill created a dual system where states would 
have the first opportunity to enact safety regulations and, if they chose not to do so, then 
the federal government would then assume that responsibility: “[f]or those States that 
have no regulation, the Simon [bill] would authorize the Consumer Protection Safety 
175 Id. at 56.
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Commission to inspect rides.  If a State like New Jersey maintains a system for 
inspection, that system would not be preempted.184
The argument for this approach was similar to the previous arguments that the 
federal government must get involved because too many states had still failed to pass 
fixed-site attraction safety regulations and, many of those that did, lacked sufficient 
uniformity to ensure a consistent level of public safety: “[s]ome 26 states have no 
amusement-ride legislation or regulation; and there are wide variations in the 24 states 
which do have regulations.”185
While this approach was a marked change from the initial post-1981 efforts to 
grant the CPSC exclusive safety governance over fixed-site attractions, both the Reagan 
administration and the CPSC opposed this bill.186  The CPSC’s opposition was based on 
the fact that it did not have the budget, expertise, or manpower to do what this bill sought 
to do:
The Consumer Product Safety Commission and the administration oppose 
the Simon [bill].  The Consumer Product Safety Commission takes the 
position that it has other matters on its agenda of things that it thinks it 
should be doing, which it believes should take priority.  It says that it does 
not have the manpower and it does not have the funds to undertake an 
inspection service for all the fixed-ride programs in the country.187
Not only did the CPSC oppose this approach, but it was also opposed by the 
amusement industry.  As an alternative, the amusement industry had decided to support a 
different approach—in this case, Senator John Danforth’s Amusement Ride Safety 
Commission Act.188  Under Senator Danforth’s amendment, rather than specifically 
deciding which level of government should regulate the safety of fixed-site attractions, 
Congress would establish a five-person commission charged with conducting an 18 
month study of this issue and, upon its conclusion, preparing a final report for 
Congress.189  The amendment also provided that, in the interim, the Commerce 
Department’s National Bureau of Standards would have the power to investigate serious 
accidents at fixed-site attractions if the State or local government where the accident 
occurred requested such assistance.190
This approach was patterned after the original NCPS bill which too provided for a 
study committee and final report on the issue of consumer safety regulation.  The 
rationale for this approach was two-pronged.  First, this approach would cost less than 
Senator Simon’s bill and did not force the CPSC to regulate an area of consumer safety 
the agency itself was on record as saying that it did not have the funds or expertise to 
effectively do so.  Second, the supporters of this approach adopted a classic states’ rights 
argument to bolster their position:  “[w]here possible...where feasible, should not our 
184
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basic predisposition in Congress be that regulation should be done at the local level and 
at the State level if it can be effectively done at that place?”191
After much debate on the propriety of these two approaches and a flurry of 
proposed amendments from both sides, both Senator Simon’s bill and Senator Danforth’s 
amendment ended up failing to pass out of Senate committee during that session.192  This 
mirrored the result in the House of Representatives where a similar debate between these 
two approaches had ensued and where neither approach obtained enough support to pass 
the entire House.193
Rather than passing on, however, the issue returned again to Congress during the 
next session when Representative Waxman re-introduced the Amusement Park Safety 
Act on October 1, 1987.194  This bill followed an approach similar to his earlier 1985 bill 
in that it sought to provide the CPSC limited jurisdiction and regulatory powers over 
fixed-site amusement parks:
The Commission and its enforcement staff will not be permitted to 
conduct routine inspections of amusement park rides in states which have 
passed inspection laws.  The only time [the] CPSC could inspect an 
amusement ride in such states would be following an accident on an 
amusement park ride which involved a fatality or personal injury requiring 
hospitalization....the CPSC would be prohibited from issuing industrywide 
product safety standards or banning an amusement ride.195
By now, however, the moment seemed to have passed for expanding the CPSC’s 
jurisdiction to include fixed-site amusement parks and, thus, the bill failed to even pass 
out of committee.  No additional bills to reverse the 1981 Amendment were introduced 
during the remainder of the session.
b. 1989-1990
The next session of Congress brought another effort to expand the CPSC’s 
regulatory jurisdiction to fixed-site amusement parks.  This effort commenced on January 
31, 1989 when Representative Frank Guarini introduced the Amusement Parks Safety 
Act.196  This bill was broader than the previously introduced legislation on this issue in 
that it did not limit the CPSC’s jurisdiction to just those states without existing fixed-site 
191 131 CONG. REC. S9999 (daily ed. July 24, 1985)(statement of Sen. Danforth).   
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attraction safety regulations.  Instead, the bill sought to allow the CPSC to inspect all 
amusement devices “at reasonable times and in a reasonable manner.”197
While this bill was never passed out of committee, the limited CPSC jurisdiction 
approach previously advocated by Representative Waxman was re-introduced during the 
same session as part of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 1989—a bill 
which dealt with a variety of CPSC governance issues in addition to fixed-site attraction 
safety regulation.198 However, following a series of legislative maneuvers where this bill 
was, at several different stages: a) combined with another bill; b) tabled; and, c) then re-
considered as part of another Senate bill, the part of the bill that assigned fixed-site 
attraction jurisdiction to the CPSC was ultimately removed from the final conference 
report in order to secure passage of other portions of the bill (including, most notably, the 
federal regulation of All Terrain Vehicles—a topic that was quickly replacing amusement 
parks as public safety enemy #1 in the eyes of many legislators and consumer groups).199
This removal concluded a tumultuous ten-year debate on this issue which at least one 
legislator termed the CPSC’s “difficult decade”.200  Following this defeat, the issue then 
disappeared from Congress for nearly an entire decade.
c. 1991-2004
From 1991 through 1998, the supporters of reversing the 1981 Amendment and 
providing the CPSC with regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site attractions appeared to be 
on hiatus, with very little legislative discussion being directed toward the issue.  In 1999, 
however, this highly controversial issue was revisited for the first time in nearly a decade 
when Representative Edward Markey from Massachusetts led a renewed effort to grant 
the CPSC regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site attractions by introducing the National 
Amusement Safety Act of 1999.201
Representative Markey introduced this bill following a series of amusement park 
fatalities during the last week of August 1999.  During that week—one which a leading 
national magazine termed “one of the most calamitous weeks in the history of America’s 
amusement parks”202—a 12-year-old child died after falling through a harness on a ride a 
Great America’s Santa Clara park and a 20-year-old man, as well as a 39-year-old 
woman and her 8-year-old daughter, died on roller coasters at Paramount’s King’s 
Dominion Park in Virginia and Gillian’s Wonderland Pier park in New Jersey 
respectively.203 While admitting that “roller coasters are, in general, quite safe”, 
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Representative Markey concluded that the potentially “catastrophic” consequences of 
amusement parks without federal regulation outweighed any existing safety record.204
Notably, this short, one page bill eschewed the previous 1980s attempts by 
Senator Simon and others to divide regulatory responsibilities between the states and the 
federal government and, instead, sought to empower the federal government with near 
exclusive regulatory authority over fixed-site attractions by closing what Representative 
Markey was calling the 1981 “Rollercoaster Loophole”205:
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘National Amusement Park Ride Safety Act 
of 1999’.
SEC. 2. JURISDICTION OVER FIXED SITE AMUSEMENT RIDES.
 Section 3(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2052(1)) is
amended--
      (1) in the second sentence, by striking ‘, and which is not permanently 
fixed to a site’; and
      (2) by striking the third sentence. 
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
 There are authorized to be appropriated to the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission $500,000 for each fiscal year to enable the Commission to 
carry out the Consumer Product Safety Act as amended by section 2.206
As opposed to the extensive efforts of the Simon approach or the Danforth 
approach during the 1980s to federally address the issue of fixed-site attraction safety, the 
Markey approach essentially did nothing more than specifically repeal the 1981 
Amendment concerning fixed-site attractions.  In other words, the Markey bill simply 
sought to restore the 1981 status quo.  Considering that the status quo was that two circuit 
courts had disagreed whether fixed-site attractions fell within the CPSC’s definition of 
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visited Feb. 27, 2004).
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“consumer product” and that the United States Supreme Court had not yet finally 
resolved that disagreement among the circuit courts, the reality of this approach was that 
it simply restored the pending litigation regarding what activities or products fell within 
the definition of “consumer product” under the CPSA.
On May 16, 2000, the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and 
Consumer Protection held an extensive hearing on this issue.207  During this hearing, 
representatives from both industry groups and consumer groups, as well as personnel 
from the CPSC, offered testimony on this issue.208  Predictably, the testimony cut along 
lines with the amusement industry opposed to the Markey bill and consumer groups 
supporting it.  Ultimately, the bill died in committee during that session.  
However, as was the case in the early 1980s, the proponents of this effort would 
not go quietly.  On April  4, 2001, Representative Markey re-introduced the National 
Amusement Park Ride Safety Act of 2001.209  This bill was essentially the same as the 
Amusement Park Ride Safety Act of 1999 in that it sought to rescind the 1981 
amendment and appropriate $500,000 to the CPSC to regulate fixed-site attractions.  
Notably, this bill did differ from the 1999 legislation in that the 1999 bill had 52 
cosponsors and received a full subcommittee hearing while the 2001 bill could garner 
only 19 cosponsors and did not receive a subcommittee hearing.210  Ultimately, the one 
major trait that the 2001 bill had most in common with the 1999 bill was that it also died 
in committee.  
Despite its apparent declining support, on May 22, 2003, Representative Markey 
again returned to this issue when he introduced the National Amusement Park Ride 
Safety Act of 2003.211  This bill was essentially a duplicate of the 1999 and 2001 bills 
again primarily seeking to repeal the 1981 amendment.  Apparently hoping to avoid the 
same fate as his previous two bills, Representative Markey publicized that a variety of 
consumer groups, as well as the American Academy of Pediatrics, as supporting this 
bill.212  This bill also attempted to seize upon the fact that, several weeks before its 
introduction, an 11 year old child died while riding a rollercoaster at the Six Flags Great 
America park in Gurnee, Illinois.213
As of the date of this article, the 2003 bill remains in committee.  No hearings 
have occurred on this bill and fewer than 20 co-sponsors have signed on. Nevertheless, 
because this issue is just one or two deadly accidents away from being thrust back into 
the public spotlight, one very important question must still be addressed: should the 
safety of fixed-site amusement parks be federally or state regulated? A careful review of 
all the facts concerning this issue demonstrates that the current federal effort to assign 
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jurisdiction over fixed-site attractions to the CPSC is founded upon faulty facts and a 
flawed rationale—and may even go so far as to decreasing, rather than increasing, 
consumer safety.
III. A Critical Analysis of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Park Safety Regulation 
Should Remain a State-Governed Issue.
The current efforts, led by Representative Markey, to re-assign safety regulatory 
authority over fixed-site park attractions to the CPSC are based on four general  
arguments.214  Significantly, a careful review of each argument reveals that all four are 
flawed to the point of fundamentally undermining objective support for this proposed 
action.  These flaws are best demonstrated by the faulty facts and logic upon the 
proponents of NAPRSA base their arguments.  
The end result is that enacting NAPRSA would create such procedural and 
substantive confusion and inefficiency that it enacting could very well increase the safety 
risk to guests at fixed-site attractions rather than decrease it.  As a result, the following 
analysis seeks to debunk the primary arguments in favor of NAPRSA and demonstrate 
why fixed-site amusement park safety regulation should remain a state-governed issue.  
In addition, appended to this section is a spreadsheet that contains a detailed 
analysis of all existing state fixed-site attraction safety regulations.  Finally, based upon 
this extensive analysis, this section offers a proposed model state law for the safety 
governance of fixed-site amusement attractions.
Error #1:  
“The number of serious injuries on ‘fixed location’ rides has risen dramatically from 
1994 through 1998.”215
During each of the three Congressional sessions that the NAPRSA has been 
introduced, its supporters have relied upon the argument that fixed-site attraction 
accidents have been on the increase: “[t]he accident statistics highlight the folly of 
granting an exemption from federal safety regulation to amusement park rides.  Injuries 
are rising rapidly on the one category of amusement park rides that the CPSC is barred 
from overseeing.”216
Specific claims by the bill’s supporters have included: “[e]mergency room 
injuries more than doubled in the last five years”217 and “[b]eginning in 1996, a sharp 
upward trend can be seen in hospital emergency room visits by passengers on 
‘fixed’rides...These injuries soared 96 percent over the next five years.”218
As a basis for these claims, the bill’s proponents have relied upon consumer 
injury statistics derived from the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System 
(“NEISS”).  However, a careful review of the NEISS reveals that its statistics regarding 
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consumer injuries on fixed-site attractions is simply unreliable—primarily because of the 
flawed methodology used to develop these statistics.  In fact, not only have independent 
studies recognized these flaws, but the CPSC itself has now acknowledged that the 
NEISS fixed-site attraction injury statistics are unreliable.  To understand why these 
statistics are unreliable, one must first understand the NEISS itself.
A. The History and Development of the National Electronic 
Injury Surveillance System.
The CPSC uses the NEISS to provide it with consumer injury statistics involving 
fixed-site attractions.  It is a “probability sample of hospital emergency departments in 
the United States and its territories.”219  The NEISS is designed to “produce national 
estimates of the number of consumer products-related injuries treated in hospital 
emergency rooms.”220  Essentially, the NEISS is analogous to a national political poll on 
an issue or candidate.  Like those polls, the NEISS results are not generated from a 
complete census of all hospitals (or voters) but are obtained using a mathematical 
equation to create a reliable representative sample of hospitals (or voters).
The NEISS was created in 1971221  using a sample of 119 hospitals in an attempt 
to quantify the number of consumer product injuries.222  In October 1978, the NEISS was 
redesigned using a new sample based upon an updated inventory of U.S. hospitals.223
The 1978 redesign also changed the way the NEISS was organized by dividing the 
sample hospitals into four strata based on size.224  This stratified approach allows for a 
more precise manipulation of the NEISS data than the initial non-stratified approach 
because it further sub-categorizes the data itself.  
In 1989 and 1991, the NEISS sample was again updated to use a more updated 
hospital inventory in the former case and to increase the overall sample size in the latter 
case.225  The NEISS sample was again redesigned in 1997 to incorporate the latest 
available U.S. hospital inventory as well as make minor structural changes.226  Finally, in 
1999, the CPSC began to adjust the NEISS sample annually to insure that it used the 
most updated hospital inventory (and, thus, obtained the most reliable data).227
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Bureau of Product Safety initially administered the NEISS from its creation in May 1971 until the CPSC’s 
commencement in July 1973.  Id.
222 TOM SCHROEDER & KIMBERLY AULT, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION THE NEISS 
SAMPLE (DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION) 1979 TO 1996 1 (2001), available at 
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following a series of 1984 budget reductions.  Id. at 2.
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225 Id. at 2.
226 SCHROEDER & AULT, supra n. 5, at 1.One such change was revising the fifth stratum to represent 
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227 Id. at 2-3.
40
Another major change occurred in 2000 when the CPSC decided to expand the 
NEISS to collect data on all hospital treated injuries rather than just those resulting from 
consumer product use.228 This expansion allowed the CPSC to generate data from a 
variety of other circumstances, including injuries in which there is no specific product 
mentioned and injuries for products that fall outside the jurisdiction of the CPSC.229
Information is collected for analysis under the NEISS by four methods:
1. continual and routine surveillance of emergency department 
injuries from NEISS sample hospitals;
2. non-routine special surveillance projects (this method is usually 
reserved for CPSC research into specific types of injuries or products);
3. CPSC telephone interviews of specific injury victims or witnesses 
(this method constitutes less than 1% of all cases and is usually also 
reserved for specific research projects);
4. CPSC on-site investigations (this method is utilized even less often 
than the telephone interviews).230
The procedure for obtaining data generated by the continual and routine 
surveillance method involves a system in which the type of injury and other basic patient 
information is entered onto the patient’s medical record each time a patient presents 
herself to a NEISS sample hospital’s emergency department.231  Each evening, a hospital-
designated NEISS coordinator enters the relevant information using a special NEISS 
coding manual and then transmits that data via electronic means to the CPSC’s internal 
database where it is then manipulated to generate consumer injury statistics.232
Overall, the NEISS appears to be a highly-credible source for statistical consumer 
injury information.  And, in fact, proponents of NAPRSA have supported their claims 
that fixed-site amusement ride injuries have dramatically increased by using NEISS-
generated data.  Simply put, the presumed credibility of the NEISS injury data serves as a 
core foundation for NAPRSA’s attempt to federalize fixed-site amusement park safety 
regulations.  It stands to reason then that, if the NEISS data relied upon by proponents of 
NAPRSA to evidence an alleged increase in fixed-site amusement ride injuries was 
flawed, then that argument itself would be flawed and unreliable. 
B. Independent Studies Have Concluded that the NEISS Statistics 
for Consumer Fixed-site Attraction Injuries are Unreliable.
While the NAPRSA proponents point to an alleged “dramatic” increase in fixed-
site attraction injuries as grounds for federalizing fixed-site attraction regulation, several 
recent independent studies have demonstrated that, not only have such injuries not
increased, but, in some instances, they have actually decreased.  One report, for example, 
228 U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, NEISS:  THE NATIONAL ELECTRONIC INJURY SURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEM:  A TOOL FOR RESEARCHERS 6 (2000), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/neiss/2000d015.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2004).
229 Id. at 6.
230 Id. at 7-11.
231 Id. at 8.
232 Id. at 9.
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involved a detailed analysis of various engineering and scientific literature (including 
CPSC materials).233  This report plainly concluded that a variety of deficiencies 
precluded any credible reliance on the NEISS injury data as developed by the CPSC:  
The use of a single product code that includes amusement attractions of all 
types, the mis-match between the geographic distribution of amusement 
parks and NEISS hospitals, changes in the sample of hospitals beginning 
in 1997, and the redaction of ride and park specific identifiers reduces the 
usefulness of NEISS data for estimating amusement park ride injuries and 
assessing trends.234
These deficiencies clearly demonstrate the inherent unreliability of the claims by 
the supporters of NAPRSA that consumer fixed-site attraction injuries are increasing—
since those claims are based on the CPSC’s flawed methodology of using the NEISS 
data.
The report, however, did not just demonstrate the unreliability of the CPSC’s use 
of the NEISS data.  Instead, the report took the important additional step of re-analyzing 
the raw NEISS data in light of the identified deficiencies in the CPSC’s methodology for 
analyzing the same data.  After developing a revised and more accurate methodology for 
analyzing the raw NEISS statistics, this report concluded (among other things) that:
1. “[A]nalysis of CPSC NEISS data from 1997-2001 showed no 
statistical increase in the national estimate of the number of injuries 
associated with fixed site amusement park attractions over that time period 
while attendance has increased.”235
2. “[A]nalysis of CPSC NEISS data from 1997 to 2001 indicate[s] 
that risk of injury associated with fixed site amusement parks has not 
exhibited a statistically significant trend during that time.  Risk of injury 
associated with fixed site amusement park attractions has dropped in each 
of the last two years.”236
The clear result is that, while NAPRSA proponents assert that consumer fixed-site 
attraction injuries have increased—thus, warranting federal intervention—an independent 
analysis of the raw injury statistics directly refutes that claim.
233 EXPONENT FAILURE ANALYSIS ASSOCIATES, INVESTIGATION OF AMUSEMENT PARK AND ROLLER 
COASTER INJURY LIKELIHOOD AND SEVERITY (2002), available at http://www.emerson-
associates.com/safety/articles/ExponentReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).  While a fixed-site park 
operator commissioned this report, there is no indication, much less accusation, that that commission has 
affected the results of this report.  
234 Id. at 2.
235 Id.
236 Id. Again, while the findings refers to “NEISS data”, the methodology of analyzing the NEISS data for 
this report differed from the CPSC’s methodology of analyzing the same data and resulted in a more 
accurate measurement of consumer fixed-site park injuries.  For a comparison of the two methodologies, 
see Id. at 44.  In the end, it is not the concept of the NEISS that is flawed but, rather, the CPSC’s execution 
of that concept.
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Another report, this one prepared by the American Association of Neurological 
Surgeons, further demonstrated the inherent flaws of the CPSC NEISS data relied upon 
by the supporters of NAPRSA.237  Like the first study, this study also found various 
deficiencies with the CPSC’s NEISS data, including injury coding that was too 
generalized, hospital reporting abnormalities, and ineffective sampling methods such as 
small sample numbers that could “significantly skew results.”238  These deficiencies led 
the report to conclude that “[w]hile the CPSC data is probably useful for well distributed, 
and clearly identified product categories (e.g. toasters), it is not designed for determining 
incidence rates for these exceedingly rare and difficult to identify events.”239
Other independent reports have further characterized the unreliability of the 
CPSC’s NEISS data as everything from being plagued with a “high degree of 
imprecision”240 to being nothing more than a “wild ass guess”.241  In sum, the 
independent reports and studies that have considered the CPSC NEISS incident statistics 
have roundly criticized those figures as unreliable and certainly not a sound basis for 
arguing that consumer fixed-site attraction injuries are on the increase.  However, those 
outside the CPSC have not only leveled this criticism.  In fact, recently, even the CPSC 
has acknowledged the unreliability of its very own NEISS statistics.
C. The CPSC Itself Has Concluded that the NEISS Statistics for 
Consumer Fixed-Site Attraction Injuries are Unreliable.
The CPSC itself has now concluded that its own reliance upon the NEISS 
statistics it generated was flawed since its current methodology is simply unreliable.  In 
particular, the CPSC recently published a report titled, Amusement Ride-Related Injuries 
and Deaths in the United States:  2003 Update,242 that stated:
Because fixed-site injuries occur in a relatively small number of locations, 
the sites of amusement and theme parks, the number of recorded injuries 
in NEISS depends to a large degree on the geographical closeness of the 
237 NEURO-KNOWLEDGE, FIXED THEME PARK RIDES AND NEUROLOGICAL INJURIES: EXPERT PANEL 
CONSENSUS REPORT  (2002), available at http://www.emerson-
associates.com/safety/articles/AANSreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
238 Id. at 8.
239 Id. at 8;  the report was generally referring to consumer fixed-site amusement park injuries while 
specifically focusing on the subset of neurological injuries for the primary thrust of the report.
240 Amusement Park Industry Issues Analysis Faulting CPSC Injury Report, CPSC Monitor, Sept. 2000, at 
1, 2, available at http://www.consumeralert.org/pubs/monitor/2000/Sep00.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 
2004)(quoting Ed Heiden, former CPSC chief policy planning economist and now principal with Heiden 
Associates).
241
 Michael W. Lynch, Roller Coaster Regulation: Federal Safety Busybodies Turn Their Sights on 
Amusement Parks, REASON ONLINE, June 28, 2001, at http://www.reason.com/ml/ml062801.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2004)(quoting Howard Fienberg, research analyst with Statistical Assessment Service, a 
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242 MARK S. LEVENSON, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, AMUSEMENT RIDE-RELATED INJURIES 
AND DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003 UPDATE (2003), available at 
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NEISS hospitals to the parks.  Thus, the utility of NEISS for estimating 
fixed-site ride injuries may be limited.243
The CPSC found the utility of the NEISS to estimate fixed-site attraction injuries 
to be so limited that it did not even include such injuries in the body of the report.244  In 
fact, not only did the CPSC find the original NEISS statistics to be unreliable, but, upon 
re-analyzing these statistics, the CPSC even found at least one recent instance where 
yearly fixed-site attraction injuries had actually decreased:
Since the last report, the NEISS injury records for amusement rides have 
been extensively reviewed.  Based on this review, historical estimates that 
appear in this report differ from those of previous reports.  The largest 
difference is for the year 2001, in which the fixed-site estimate is lower
and the mobile estimate is higher than in the previous report.245
So what does this report mean?  Basically, it means that the CPSC itself does not 
believe that the NEISS accident statistics relied upon by the NAPRSA proponents are 
reliable.  Considered alongside the fact that independent studies have also found these  
accident statistics to be unreliable, the clear import of these findings is that the claim that 
“the number of serious injuries on ‘fixed location’ rides has risen dramatically from 1994 
through 1998” lacks any objective support and certainly does not serve as a legitimate 
basis for removing the responsibility of fixed-site attraction safety regulation from the 
states and assigning jurisdiction to the CPSC.
Error #2:  
“[M]any states have simply failed to step in where the federal safety agency has been 
excluded.”246
As an additional basis for federalizing all fixed-site attraction safety regulation, 
the proponents of NAPRSA have repeatedly pointed to the fact that several states 
maintain no fixed-site attraction safety law while several others maintain only cursory 
laws that lack any real regulatory power.  While it is true that two states have not passed 
a fixed-site attraction safety law, and that several other states passed law with only 
minimal enforcement provisions, the argument that these states are “many” in nature is 
simply inaccurate.  This inaccuracy is demonstrated by the comparative study of existing 
state fixed-site safety laws that is attached to this article as Appendix A.  
243 Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
244 Id. at 2 (“Because of these concerns about fixed-site injury estimates, the body of this report does not 
provide fixed-site ride injury estimates”).  
245 Id. at 6 (emphasis added).  This finding is even more noteworthy when one considers that the type of 
amusement attraction that the CPSC currently regulates (mobile attractions) actually increased while the 
type of amusement attraction that the states regulate (fixed-site attractions) decreased.  
246
 145 CONG. REC. E2042 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1999)(statement of Rep. Markey). 
44
A. A Review of Existing State Fixed-Site Attraction Safety Laws 
Reveals that the Vast Majority of States are Properly 
Exercising their Traditional Police Power over Public Safety.
The study whose results are memorialized in Appendix A was conducted by 
identifying all existing state laws and/or regulations247 addressing fixed-site attraction 
safety and then analyzing the similarities (and dissimilarities) of these laws.  A review of 
Appendix A clearly reveals that a vast majority of states maintain extensive safety laws 
that regulate a variety of issues involving fixed-site amusement parks most notably 
including:
1. The requirement of pre-operation and post-operation inspections
2. The requirement that operators maintain liability insurance
3. The requirement that operators report certain types of fixed-site attraction 
incidents
4. The authority of the state to close or suspend operation of an attraction
5. The authority of the state to fine or otherwise penalize fixed-site attraction 
operators
6. The authority of the state to require certain attraction safety postings for 
guests248
While not all of the existing state fixed-site attraction safety laws maintain all of 
these types of provisions, the laws of over 40 states currently maintain at least four of 
these provisions (as well as additional provisions identified in Appendix A).  Quite 
clearly, an actual objective review of these existing laws reveals that there is not the 
widespread lack of state-based fixed-site attraction regulations as claimed by the 
NAPRSA proponents.  Simply repeating this myth at every opportunity does not prove it 
true.  Instead, short of the states beginning a mass repeal of existing fixed-site attraction 
safety laws, the reality is just the opposite of the argument propounded by the NAPRSA 
proponent—“many states” do have fixed-site attraction safety laws that provide a broad 
range of regulatory mechanisms. 
B. State-Based Regulation of Fixed-Site Attractions Offers 
Concrete Advantages Over Federal-Based Fixed-Site 
Attraction Regulation.
The question of does the federal government have legal authority to regulate 
fixed-site attraction (whether it be through the Commerce Clause, some type of police 
powers of its own that it might have accrued as a sovereign governmental entity or by 
other means) certainly serves as an interesting legal theory debate.  However, it avoids 
the practical question of should the federal government seek to regulate fixed-site 
attractions. Even if the federal government maintained such a right in theory, it simply 
247
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could not prudently displace the states prudently as the primary regulator of fixed-site 
attractions.  In fact, the CPSC itself has previously recognized that, even though might 
have the legal authority to exercise regulatory jurisdiction in some instances, the safety 
issue might still be best addressed by the state governments: “[e]ven though the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission has authority to regulate the safety of paddle 
boats, the problem in this case could probably be best solved by the state or local 
authorities.”249
In the case of fixed-site amusement attractions, there are concrete advantages to 
maintaining state safety regulation of this area.  For example, the CPSC has not inspected 
or otherwise regulated a single fixed-site attraction since 1980.  Importantly, during these 
last twenty plus years, the engineering, operating, and maintaining of fixed-site 
amusement attractions has changed, with today’s attractions not only going faster, higher, 
and farther, but—with the development of computers and other technology—becoming 
much more complex than any fixed-site attraction that the CPSC briefly regulated from 
roughly 1976 to 1980.  
Conversely, the states have much more experience at inspecting and regulating 
fixed-site attractions.  Some states have regulated these attractions even prior to 1976, 
while still others have developed their programs during the interim.  This has resulted in 
the states employing or contracting with personnel, such as attraction inspectors, who 
over this time have developed expertise concerning the increased complexities of fixed-
site amusement attractions.  If fixed-site attraction regulation was suddenly re-assigned to 
the federal government, the federal government would have to either train new inspectors 
from scratch or hire away currently trained inspectors from the states (since the states 
would no longer need such inspectors).  
In doing so, the federal government would have to choose between relocating all 
of its inspectors to a central location or open up a series of regional and/or local 
inspection offices across the country.  After all, unlike nearly all of the consumer 
products that the CPSC regulates, fixed-site amusement attractions cannot be shipped to a 
central CPSC office for testing.  Either approach will result in a great expense to the 
CPSC to simply set up the inspection system, much less actually conduct inspections at 
the approximately 600 fixed-site parks across the country.  The reality is that, even before 
the CPSC actually inspects a single fixed-site attraction, it will have invested 
thousands—if not millions—of dollars re-creating a system that currently exists in nearly 
all states. 
Moreover, federalizing the entire fixed-site amusement regulation system would 
also eliminate the inherent advantages of maintaining an inspection operation near the 
actual fixed-site attractions since those attractions cannot practically be shipped to a 
centralized CPSC testing facility.  Again, while the proximity of the inspectors might not 
matter if the product was one that could be promptly and, if needed, regularly shipped to 
a central CPSC testing facility (such as a blender or lawn mower), because of its very 
nature, this cannot be done with a fixed-site attraction.  Thus, if an incident did occur on a 
fixed-site attraction, in order to most quickly respond to that incident, the CPSC would 
have to maintain a large set of regional and/or local offices—a very costly proposition 
that the CPSC has previously dismantled.  
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This problem goes directly to the question of whether Congress should federalize 
fixed-site amusement attraction regulation (even if it legally could do so) and was 
directly addressed during the contentious debates that followed the 1981 Amendment.  In 
particular, during a 1985 hearing on the issue, one of the CPSC commissioners succinctly 
outlined the practical problem with federalizing fixed-site attraction regulation:
The record before us does not indicate a crying need that should override 
our current system of federalism with the practical effect of reinventing 
the wheel at the Federal level.  The State and local governments, in 
cooperation with industry, have logged impressive safety records.  In light 
of their fine work, I do not feel it is necessary to embark on a duplicative, 
costly Federal program.  We ought to instead encourage adoption of an 
inspection program in those States that do not have them, but where there 
is a need.250
Ultimately, this CPSC commissioner concluded that the determination of who 
should regulate fixed-site attractions ought not to turn on who legally could but rather 
what level of government was best situated do so: “[i]f we are really concerned with 
maximizing consumer safety...we should first ask if this job is really the legitimate 
function of the Federal Government or if the State and local governments are not the 
more appropriate holders of this regulatory responsibility.”251
A careful review of the existing state fixed-site safety laws demonstrates that, 
while a few exceptions do exist, state governments clearly maintain an expertise and 
scope of knowledge and experience that vastly outweighs the brief fixed-site safety 
regulatory foray by the CPSC from the late 1970s.  This alone is a compelling reason 
why, even if the federal government could legally exert regulatory authority in this area, 
the state governments are certainly “the more appropriate holders of this regulatory 
responsibility.”252
C. Even if Several States Have Not Promulgated Fixed-Site 
Attraction Safety Regulations, that Does Not Serve as a Sound 
Basis for Removing Regulatory Authority from those States 
that Have Promulgated Safety Regulations.
250 Hearing on Amusement Park Safety Before the House Subcomm. on Health. and the Environment of the 
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One of the main reasons that NAPRSA proponents offer for eliminating all state 
based fixed-site attraction regulation is because a very small number of states have not 
passed any fixed-site amusement law or have passed only cursory regulations that barely 
serve to provide regulatory safeguards.  This is hardly a sound basis for federalizing this 
entire field because, as demonstrated above, it would eliminate a vast regulatory network 
currently in place for fixed-site attraction guests.
However, the question can be reasonably asked, what about guests in those small 
minority of states with no or little safety regulation of fixed-site attractions?  Two 
reasonable options seem to exist:  1) permit the CPSC to regulate those states without 
fixed-site attraction safety laws (similar to the approach taken in the mid-1980s by 
Senator Simon’s bill) or 2) persuade those states with no, or very little, safety regulation 
of fixed-site attractions to promptly pass a comprehensive fixed-site amusement 
attraction safety law.
When fully considered, the second option is rife with potential because it would 
allow the individual states to continue to experiment with the most effective methods for 
safeguarding guest safety on fixed-site attractions, while at the same time saving the 
CPSC from having to establish a nationwide inspection and enforcement network.  In 
light of these practical benefits that could be realized by convincing states to adopt 
comprehensive regulations, this project undertook an effort to carefully analyze the 
various state-based approaches toward regulating fixed-site attractions.  This effort 
resulted in the comparative study of all state fixed-site attraction safety laws that 
accompanies this article as Appendix A.  
Persuading those states with little or no safety regulation that some legislation is 
required is only half the battle though. Instead, one should provide these states with 
guidance in drafting and enacting such a law.  Therefore, in addition to the comparative 
study, this project has also prepared the model state fixed-site attraction safety law that is 
attached hereto as Appendix B.  This model law was drafted to include those provisions 
from existing fixed-site attraction safety laws that were deemed to best safeguard guests.  
The goal of this model law is to provide all states with a framework of significant 
provisions from existing state laws while specifically providing those states with little or 
no regulation an efficient means to begin formulating a comprehensive state-based fixed-
site park safety regulation.
Error #3:  
“[S]tates are not equipped and not inclined to act as a national clearinghouse of safety 
problems associated with particular rides or with operator or patron errors.”253
As a further basis for their effort, NAPRSA proponents have essentially argued 
that the states are not equipped to regulate fixed-site amusement attractions and, 
therefore, Congress should re-assign the responsibility of fixed-site attraction regulation 
to the CPSC.  However, in addition to the fact (as discussed above) that the CPSC 
currently does not possess any expertise or experience in this field, this argument fails for 
a very threshold reason:  the CPSC does not have sufficient funding to regulate fixed-site 
attractions.  In fact, the disparity between the amount that NAPRSA would appropriate to 
253
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the CPSC for this responsibility and the amount that the CPSC itself is on record as 
stating it will need to actually execute this new responsibility is huge.  
NAPRSA seeks to appropriate $500,000 to the CPSC to regulate fixed-site 
attractions: “[t]here are authorized to be appropriated to the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission $500,000 for each fiscal year to enable the Commission to carry out the 
Consumer Product Safety Act as amended by this Act.”254
As early as 1999, however, the CPSC advised Congress that, in addition to extra 
staff (and the attendant costs incurred with adding staff), the CPSC would also require 
millions of dollars to regulate fixed-site attractions:  “The Commission would require at 
least $5 million dollars and additional staff to address the safety of these products.”255
Now, five years later, NAPRSA still seeks to apportion millions of dollars less the 
amount that CPSC has stated it would need to actually regulate fixed-site attractions.  
This disparity represents a very real threat to consumer safety at fixed-site 
attractions and raises alarming questions regarding whether the federal government really 
would be sufficiently equipped to conduct a comprehensive and nationwide fixed-site 
attraction regulatory effort.  This question must be confronted at the same time that, not 
only has not a single state repealed its fixed-site attraction safety law but, in fact, several 
states (including California, the state with the most fixed-site parks) have bolstered their 
own fixed-site safety regulations.  Clearly, the claim by NAPRSA proponents that the 
states are unequipped to regulate fixed-site attractions ignores the current standing of 
existing state regulations as well as the financial realities that the CPSC would face were 
it to engage in a nationwide fixed-site regulatory program—a reality that even the CPSC 
itself recognizes would be substantially under funded by the proposed appropriations 
under NAPRSA.
The real and tangible danger confronted by fixed-site attraction guests under a 
federalized approach to fixed-site attraction regulation was succinctly described, by a 
CPSC commissioner no less, nearly twenty years ago during Congressional hearings on 
this issue: “[t]o provide jurisdiction over 660 fixed-site parks without the ability to 
properly inspect them, as obviously we could not, would be nothing short of a regulatory 
mirage.  Sometimes in a well-intended quest for consumer guardianship we turn too 
easily to the Federal quick fix...”256
Nearly two decades later, NAPRSA still remains nothing more than shiny, high 
publicity mirage whose primary effect will be to disguise a grossly under funded and ill-
equipped regulatory scheme dressed up with a glossy public relations outfit—a truly 
modern example of an emperor without clothes.
Error #4:  
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“The manufacturer or owner of every other consumer product in America is required by 
law to inform the CPSC whenever it becomes aware that the product may pose a 
substantial risk of harm.”257
NAPRSA proponents have repeatedly claimed that “[e]very other consumer 
product affecting interstate commerce…endures CPSC oversight.”258  This argument 
seems to suggest that, since everything else is CPSC-regulated, then fixed-site attractions 
should be CPSC-regulated as well.  The danger with this argument is that it emphasizes 
form over substance because it fails to reveal any specific reason why the CPSC would 
be a better regulator of this field.  
Worse yet, the statement itself is inaccurate.  First, it assumes that fixed-site 
attraction attractions are “consumer products” despite the fact that, as discussed earlier in 
this article, two different circuits have disagreed on that issue and the Supreme Court has 
not resolved this disagreement between the circuits.  However, that is not the limit of this 
argument’s inaccuracy though.
Instead, as also discussed earlier in this article, contrary Congressman Markey’s 
misstatement, a variety of other products used by consumers are not regulated by the 
CPSC.  The CPSC does not, for example, regulate consumer boat safety, consumer drugs, 
food, cosmetics, or medical devices, consumer motor vehicles or tires or consumer 
aircraft safety.  Rather, all of these areas are regulated by federal entities other than the 
CPSC.  Moreover, the safety of some products used by consumers—such as consumer 
office buildings, meeting places or homes—are not regulated by the federal government 
at all, but, instead, are regulated by state and local authorities.  
The simple fact is that, even if NAPRSA supporters could reveal a compelling 
reason why consumers would actually benefit from amassing the safety regulation of all 
products under a single roof, the reality is that they have not.  Quite simply, NAPRSA 
supporters erroneous statements notwithstanding, all products used by consumers are not 
regulated by the CPSC.  Therefore, it is highly dubious for NAPRSA proponents to rely 
on such a claim as a basis for dismantling the existing state-based regulatory structure 
and replacing it with an under funded, inexperienced, and ill-equipped federal regulatory 
device.
IV. Conclusion
Fixed-site amusement parks are a unique type of product because all interaction 
with these products—whether it be their use, inspection, or otherwise—must come to the 
attraction rather than bringing the attraction to the one seeking interaction.  For practical 
reasons, this has resulted in states regulating the safety of fixed-site amusement 
attractions within their own borders.  The states have been empowered to engage in this 
regulation through their traditional police powers over their citizenry’s safety.
As the trend toward federalizing other types of products used by consumers has 
expanded, so has the pressure to fold fixed-site attraction safety regulation into the 
federal tent.  In fact, for a brief time, the federal government—through the CPSC—
engaged in such regulation.  However, in 1981, Congress clarified the question that had 
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divided the circuit courts:  did fixed-site attractions fall within the scope of the CPSC’s 
regulatory authority?  In answering no to this question, Congress opted to leave states in 
charge of regulating fixed-site attractions.
Since that time, nearly all of the states have passed laws doing just that, although, 
admittedly, a few states remain that have either no fixed-site attraction regulation or just 
the barest of legislation.  Because effective fixed-site attraction regulation is a compelling 
need for the public, several members of Congress—aided by various advocacy groups—
have renewed the effort to federalize fixed-site attraction regulation within the CPSC.  In 
doing so, these proponents have offered a variety of reasons, including the erroneous 
assertion that fixed-site amusement ride safety has dramatically decreased during recent 
years as well as the inaccurate assumption that the CPSC is better-situated to conduct 
such a regulatory effort.
All of these arguments are fatally flawed in that they are either premised on 
inaccurate information or unsound logic.  In fact, a careful review and analysis of existing 
state fixed-site attraction safety laws reveals just the opposite of what these arguments 
suggest.  States are engaging in an increasingly thorough and, based upon independent 
empirical studies, more effective governance of fixed-site attraction safety.  The prospect 
of removing this authority from the states and reassigning it to a federal agency--that 
admittedly has neither the funding nor the manpower to undertake such an effort--
demands an immediate and objective evaluation of whether this should occur.  The mere 
fact that the federal government may or may not have a legitimate basis for exercising 
such authority does not automatically mean that it should exercise such authority.
In the case of fixed-site amusement parks, there is absolutely no objective 
evidence that the federal government can more competently or effectively regulate this 
important and growing field.  The only exception to this might be for the federal 
government to intervene and regulate fixed-site attractions in those states that have failed 
to pass a fixed-site safety law (or have failed to pass a law that is more than the barest of 
bones in nature).  Other than these two isolated situations, once the rhetoric and 
demagoguery are stripped away, the result is that the objective facts and data simply do 
not demonstrate a need to federalize fixed-site attractions.  
For these reasons, this article has endeavored to provide a detailed and objective 
examination into the development of this area of law as well as the existing state of fixed-
site amusement attraction regulation.  Upon doing so, the conclusion is very clear:  the 
states are better-equipped and better-situated to regulate consumer use of fixed-site 
amusement park attractions, and should maintain their jurisdiction over the issue.
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Alabama ALA. CODE §§ 11-51-102 (2003); 40-12-47 NO NO -------- NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Alaska ALASKA STAT. §§ 05.20.010-05.20.120 
(2003); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, §§ 78.010-
78.180 (2003)
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES NO NO YES
Arizona NO STATUTE -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------




NO YES [1] YES YES YES YES YES
California CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 7900-7932 (LEXIS 
2003) 
YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-20-101 (2003); 8 COLO. 
CODE REGS. 1101-12 (2002)
NO NO -------- NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-129 to 29-143(a) 
(2003)
YES YES Annually NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 6401-6409 (2003) NO YES Annually NO NO NO YES YES YES NO
DC D.C. CODE § 47-2823 (2003) NO NO -------- NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Florida FLA. STAT. § 616.242 (2003) YES YES [2] Semi-
annually
YES YES YES YES YES YES NO
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-12-1 to 34-12-21 
(2002)
YES YES Annually NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 397-1 to 397-12 (2003) YES YES Semi-
annually
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Idaho IDAHO CODE §§ 54-1001 to 54-1020 (2003) YES NO -------- NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Illinois 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/2-1 to 85/2-19 
(2003)
YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Indiana IND. CODE §§ 22-12-1-19.1 to 22-12-4.5-8 
(2003); 685 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-1-1 to 1-5-36 
(2003)
YES YES Annually NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Iowa IOWA CODE §§ 88A.1-88A.17 (2003) YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-4801 to 40-4804 
(2002)
NO NO -------- NO NO YES NO NO NO NO
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 247.232 to 247.236 
(LEXIS 2002)
YES NO -------- NO YES NO YES YES YES NO
Louisiana LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1484.1 to 40:1484.13 
(2003)
YES YES Annually NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Maine 8 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-502, 801-806 
(2003)
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES YES YES NO
Maryland MD. BUS. REG. CODE ANN. §§ 3-101 to 3-601 
(2003); CODE MD. REGS. tit. 9.12§62.00-
62.20 (2004)
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES NO YES YES
Massachusetts MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 205A (LEXIS 
2003); 520 Code Mass. Regs. 1.00-13.14 
(2004)
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 408.651-408.670 
(2003)
YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES YES YES NO
Minnesota MINN. STAT. §§ 184B.01-184B.07 (2002) YES YES[3] Annually NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. §21-19-33 (2003) NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
[1]Arkansas law only requires government certification or employment of inspectors for inspections during operation. [2]Florida law exempts "permanent facilities that employ at least 1,000 full-time 
employees and that maintain full-time, in-house safety inspectors ' from its codified safety regulations. [3] Minnesota law exempts fixed-site amusement facilities that have in-house inspectors, a daily ride 


















































Alabama NO -------- NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Alaska YES 1 million YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
48 hrs NO NO YES YES (18) YES YES NO
Arizona -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Arkansas YES 1 million YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
24 hrs YES YES YES YES (16) NO NO YES
California YES 1 million YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
Immediately NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
Colorado YES Varies YES "any accident" Every two 
years
YES NO NO NO NO YES NO
Connecticut YES 1 million YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
4 hrs NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Delaware YES 1 million NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
DC NO -------- NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Florida YES 1 million YES Hospitalization 4 hrs YES NO YES NO NO NO NO




Next Bus Day YES NO NO YES (16) NO NO NO
Hawaii NO -------- NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Idaho NO -------- NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Illinois YES Varies NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO YES YES NO
Indiana NO -------- YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
4 hrs YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Iowa YES Varies NO -------- -------- NO YES YES NO NO YES NO
Kansas YES 1 million NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Kentucky YES Varies NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
Louisiana YES 1 million NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Maine YES No set 
amount
[4] -------- -------- NO YES YES NO NO NO YES
Maryland YES Varies YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
24 hrs YES NO YES NO YES YES NO
Massachusetts YES 1 million YES Medical 
Treatment
48 hrs YES NO YES NO NO NO NO
Michigan YES 300k [4] -------- -------- NO YES YES NO YES NO NO
Minnesota YES 1 million NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Mississippi NO -------- NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
[4]Maine, Michigan, Montana, and Nevada laws require guests, 
rather than operators, to report incidents involving injuries to 
themselves.
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Missouri MO. REV. STAT. §§ 316.200-316.237 (2003) YES YES Annually NO NO YES NO YES YES NO
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-741 to 27-1-745 
(2003)
NO NO -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1801 to 48-1820 
(2003)
YES YES Annually NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 455B.010-455B.100 
(2003)
NO NO -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
New 
Hampshire
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 321-A:1 to 321-A:9 
(2002)
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:3-31 to 5:3-59 (2003); 
N.J. ADMIN. CODE 5:14A-1.1 to 5:14A-9 (2004)
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
New Mexico N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-25-1 to 57-25-6 (2003) YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES YES YES NO
New York N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 870-a to 870-m (Consol. 
2003)
YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES YES YES NO
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-111.1 to 95-111.18 
(2003)
YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-05.1-01 to 53-05.1-05 
(2003)
YES NO -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1711.50-1711.99 
(Anderson 2003)
YES YES Annually NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, §§ 460.1-469 (2003) YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES NO YES NO
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. Ann. §§ 460.310-460.370 
(2001)
YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES YES NO YES
Pennsylvania 4 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. §§ 401-419, 501-
507 (2003)
YES YES Monthly NO YES YES YES NO YES YES
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-34.1-1 to 23-34.1-18 
(2002)
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES YES YES NO
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-18-10 to 41-18-150 
(2002); S.C. CODE REGS. 71-4000 to 71-4950
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 42-10-1 to 42-10-3 
(2003)
NO NO -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-38-101 to 56-38-105 
(2003)
NO NO -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Texas TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.001-2151.153 
(2003); TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, §§ 5.9001-
5.9014 (2003)
YES YES Annually NO NO YES [5] YES YES YES
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-61 (2003) NO NO -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 721-724 (2003) NO NO -------- NO NO NO NO YES YES NO
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 36-98.3 (2003);  13 VA. 
ADMIN. CODE 5-31-10 to 5-31-180 (2003)
YES YES Annually NO NO YES NO YES NO YES
Washington WASH. REV. CODE §§ 67.42.010-67.42.901 
(2003)
YES YES Annually NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
West Virginia W. VA. CODE §§ 21-10-1 to 21-10-19 (2003) YES YES Annually NO YES YES YES YES YES NO
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 101.12 (2002); WIS. ADMIN. CODE, 
Com. §§ 34.001-34.43 (2003)
YES YES Annually YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Wyoming NO STATUTE FOR FIXED-SITE 
ATTRACTIONS
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
[5]Texas law exempts fixed-site amusement facilities with attendance greater than 


















































Missouri YES 1 million YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
Immediately YES YES NO NO NO YES NO
Montana NO -------- [4] -------- -------- NO YES YES NO NO NO NO




YES NO NO YES (16) NO YES YES
Nevada NO -------- [4] -------- -------- NO YES YES NO NO YES NO
New 
Hampshire
YES Varies NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
New Jersey YES 1 million YES Non-minor 
injuries
Immediately YES YES YES YES (16) YES YES NO
New Mexico YES 3 million NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO YES
New York YES Varies YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
Next Bus Day NO NO YES NO NO YES NO
North 
Carolina
YES Varies YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
24 hours NO NO NO YES (18) YES NO NO
North Dakota YES Varies YES Accident No Specific 
Time
YES NO NO YES (16) NO NO NO
Ohio YES Varies YES Accident 24 hours YES YES YES YES (16) YES NO YES
Oklahoma YES 1 million NO -------- -------- YES YES YES NO YES YES NO
Oregon YES Varies NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Pennsylvania YES Varies YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
48 hours NO YES NO NO YES NO NO
Rhode Island YES 1 million YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
24 hours YES NO NO YES (18) NO NO NO
South 
Carolina
YES Varies YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
Next Bus Day YES NO NO NO YES NO NO
South Dakota YES 1million NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
Tennessee YES 250k NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Texas YES Varies YES Non-minor 
Injuries
Quarterly YES NO YES NO NO NO NO
Utah NO -------- NO -------- -------- NO YES YES NO NO NO NO
Vermont YES 1 million NO -------- -------- NO NO NO YES (18) NO NO NO
Virginia YES 200k YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
24 hours NO NO NO YES (16) YES NO NO
Washington YES 1 million NO -------- -------- NO NO NO NO NO YES NO
West Virginia YES Varies YES Death/Serious 
Inj.
24 hours NO YES NO YES (16) NO NO YES
Wisconsin NO -------- YES "more than 
first-aid"
24 hours YES NO NO YES (18) YES NO NO
Wyoming -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
[6]Nebraska law provides that the "minimum amount' of liability 
insurance shall not be greater than one million dollars per 
occurrence." Neb. Rev. Stat. Ss48-1806
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APPENDIX B
A Model State Statute for Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Regulation.
SECTION 1.  Introduction and Purpose.
The purpose of this [Act] shall be to establish uniform standards for the design, 
construction, maintenance, operation, and inspection of fixed-site amusement attractions.
SECTION 2. Short Title.  
This [Act] shall be cited as the Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Act.
Comment
The statistics set forth in the Comment sections to this proposed model act have been obtained 
from an analysis of all existing state fixed-site amusement attraction safety laws.  A compilation of the 
results of this research and analysis is set forth in Appendix A to the article entitled:  The Growing 
Showdown Over Who Should Regulate Amusement Attraction Safety: A Critical Analysis of Why States 
Should Regulate Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety by Chad D. Emerson, Assistant Professor of 
Law at Faulkner University, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law.  
Please note that, in some cases, a state may engage in a fixed-site amusement attraction 
regulatory practices that are not specifically provided for by that state’s fixed-site amusement attraction 
safety law or regulations.  The compilation has attempted to include those instances within the research 
and analysis results when possible.  Nevertheless, there may still be some states that engage in certain 
regulatory practices outside the specific and express scope of that state’s regulatory law or regulations.  
Therefore, in addition to relying upon the compiled research and analysis, the author of this compilation 
recommends directly contacting the state entity charged with regulating fixed-site amusement attractions 
if more specific questions arise.  A directory of state amusement attraction safety regulators can be 
found at: http://www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBS/amuse.PDF.
48 states and the District of Columbia currently have laws that regulate certain safety aspects of 
fixed-site amusement attractions.  The two states without any such law are Arizona and Wyoming.  At 
least eight other states and the District of Columbia have laws that regulate certain aspects of fixed-site 
amusement attraction operation, but do not require safety inspections of fixed-site amusement 
attractions. 
SECTION 3. Definitions.  
The foregoing terms in this [Act] are defined as follows:
(A) “Amusement Attraction” means any building or structure around, over or 
through which persons may move or walk, without the aid of any moving device 
integral to the building or structure, which provides amusement, pleasure, thrills 
or excitement or any mechanical device which carries or conveys passengers 
along, around, through or over a fixed or restricted route or course or within a 
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defined area, for the purpose of giving its passengers amusement, pleasure, thrills 
or excitement. 
(B) “Attendant” means an employee or agent of an amusement attraction 
operator responsible for controlling guest access and use of an amusement 
attraction. 
(C)  “Operator” means any person or entity that owns, leases, manages, or 
otherwise controls or maintains legal title to an amusement attraction.
(D) “Commissioner” means the head of the state governmental department, 
division, or agency that has safety regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site 
amusement attractions.
(E) “Department” means the state governmental department, division, or 
agency that has safety regulatory jurisdiction over fixed-site amusement 
attractions.
(F) “Fixed-Site” means an amusement attraction that is constructed to remain 
in a single, affixed location and that is not removed from that single, affixed 
location.
(G)  “Guest” means an individual who is preparing to enter, entering, 
preparing to use, using, preparing to leave, or leaving an amusement attraction for 
amusement purposes. 
(H)  “Qualified Inspector” means an individual who is an employee or 
independent contractor of a public or private agency and who has satisfied the 
qualifications set forth in Section 8 of this [Act].
Comment
Many states choose to regulate this field using language such as amusement rides
or devices.  The proposed model act does not use these terms but, instead, uses the term 
attraction as that term is more effective because a growing number of amusement 
activities do not involve guests riding actual rides.  The broader scope of the term 
“attraction” allows the proposed model act to encompass not only amusement rides, but 
also various non-ride amusement attractions such as interactive shows.
Many states also use language that regulates fixed-site amusement parks rather 
than attractions.  This approach is less desirable than the approach taken by the proposed 
model act of regulating “amusement attractions” because, in various states, amusement 
attractions are being operated outside the confines of an “amusement park”.  One such 
example is the operation of a carousel inside a shopping mall.  Regulating specific 
attractions, rather than parks, clarifies that all fixed-site attractions fall within the scope 
of the Act regardless of their location.
SECTION 4.  Duties and Responsibilities of the Department.
57
(A) The Commissioner of the Department shall be responsible for enforcing 
all provisions of this [Act].  The Commissioner of the Department may delegate 
to a third party or other governmental entity those responsibilities under this [Act] 
as the Commissioner deems reasonably necessary so long as the third party or 
other governmental entity executes such responsibility in complete accordance 
with the provisions of this [Act].  
(B) The Commissioner of the Department shall be responsible for 
promulgating all reasonable administrative regulations in furtherance of the 
purposes of this [Act] as the Commissioner deems reasonably necessary so long 
as such regulations are in compliance with the [State’s Administrative Procedures 
Act or equivalent].
Comment
Currently, over 15 states have placed fixed-site amusement attraction regulation 
within the Department of Labor (or its equivalent within said state).  Five or more states 
have placed such regulation within either the Department of Agriculture (or its equivalent 
within said state) or the Department of Public Safety (or its equivalent within said state). 
The remaining states have placed such regulation within the a variety of other 
governmental departments, divisions, or entities such as:  Department of Community 
Affairs, Department of Consumer Services, Department of Insurance, Department of 
Administration, Department of Housing, Department of Licensing and Regulation, 
Secretary of State, State Fire Marshall’s Office, Division of Building Safety or a 
specially-established governing board.
SECTION 5.  Exemptions.
This [Act] shall not apply to the following attractions:
(A) Non-mechanized playground equipment when admission is not charged 
for use of the equipment.
(B) Coin-operated or other single use-operated attractions designed for two or 
fewer guests when admission is not charged for access to the premises on which 
such attraction is located.
(C) Attractions owned and operated by the State or any political subdivision of 
the State.
(D) Activities principally devoted to the exhibition of agricultural, educational, 
scientific, religious, or artistic products.
Comment
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Over 40 states have exempted certain fixed-site amusement attractions from the 
scope of their regulatory act.  The most commonly exempted attractions are playground 
equipment, coin-operated attractions, state-operated attractions, and museum-related 
attractions.  Other types of attractions that have been exempted include:  locomotives, 
bumper boats, inflatable attractions, simulators, those located at trade shows, those 
located at amusement parks with a certain number of employees, and even “articles of 
husbandry incidental to any agricultural operation.”  See Okla. Stat. tit. § 461 (2003).
SECTION 6. Designated Safety Standards.
(A) Fixed-site amusement attractions subject to this [Act] shall be designed, 
constructed, operated, and maintained pursuant to the following safety standards:
(1) [state-designated mechanical code or standard];
(2) [state-designated electrical code or standard];
(3) [state-designated building code or standard];
(4) [state-designated fire code or standard];
(5) [state-designated plumbing code or standard]; and,
(6) [any other state-designated code or standard deemed necessary by the 
Department] 
(B) An operator of an amusement attraction shall not be considered a common 
carrier.
Comment
States have adopted a variety of different uniform codes and standards—often 
with certain revisions—as the governing safety standards for fixed-site amusement 
attractions within their borders.  Several states have also promulgated entirely original 
standards.  The proposed model act highly recommends adopting existing uniform codes 
or standards—with limited revisions, if needed—rather than promulgating entirely 
original standards, as the existing uniform codes and standards have been subject to 
extensive third-party evaluation and review.
Based upon an extensive review of the uniform codes and standards currently 
utilized by existing state fixed-site amusement attraction safety laws, the proposed model 
act recommends adoption of the following uniform codes and standards:  1) the Uniform 
or International Building Code; 2) the National Fire Protection Code; 3) the National 
Electric Code; 4) the Uniform Plumbing Code; and 5) the American Society for Testing 
and Materials World Standard for the Regulation of Amusement Devices.
SECTION 7.  Requirement of Pre-Operational and Operational Inspections.
(A) Prior to commencing initial operation for guests of a new amusement 
attraction subject to this [Act], an amusement attraction operator shall obtain an 
initial inspection certificate from a qualified inspector pursuant to the following 
procedures:
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(1) The amusement attraction operator must make a written request for 
inspection to the Department at least 60 days prior to commencing 
operation of a new amusement attraction for guests.  
(2) The Department shall then notify the amusement attraction 
operator in writing of the inspection date.
(3) The amusement attraction operator shall submit the proper 
inspection fee (as set forth in Section 13 of this [Act]) to the Department at 
least 5 days prior to a scheduled inspection.
(4) If the qualified inspector identifies any deficiencies or other 
reasonable cause to prohibit the initial operation of a new amusement 
attraction for guests, the amusement attraction operator must remedy all 
deficiencies or other reasonable causes identified by the qualified 
inspector before being issued an initial inspection certificate.
(5) Before being issued an initial inspection certificate, the amusement 
attraction operator must obtain written confirmation from a qualified 
safety inspector that the amusement attraction operator has remedied all 
such deficiencies or other reasonable causes.
(6) The initial inspection certificate shall be valid for one year from 
the date of issuance.
(B) After the expiration of the initial inspection certificate, all amusement 
attractions subject to this [Act] shall annually obtain a renewal inspection 
certificate from a qualified inspector.   The amusement attraction operator shall be 
responsible for requesting a renewal inspection at least 30 days prior to the 
expiration of an initial inspection certificate or a renewal inspection certificate.  
(C) In the event that a qualified inspector cannot conduct a timely renewal 
inspection, the existing initial inspection certificate or existing renewal inspection 
certificate shall remain valid until such time that a qualified inspector conducts a 
renewal inspection.
(D) All initial and renewal inspection certificates for an amusement attraction 
shall be available for public review during regular business hours in a single 
location designated by the operator.
Comment
Of the 48 states that currently have laws governing fixed-site amusement 
facilities, at least 30 of those states expressly and specifically require that fixed-site 
amusement attractions obtain a pre-operation inspection prior to opening to guests.  
Of the same 48 states, at least 35 states expressly and specifically require that 
fixed-site amusement attractions obtain a re-inspection after the attraction has been 
opened to guests.  At least 31 of these states require that this re-inspection occur annually 
while four of these states require semi-annual re-inspections.
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SECTION 8.  Hiring and Qualifications of Inspectors
(A) No individual may conduct an inspection pursuant to Section 7 of this 
[Act] without first obtaining certification as a qualified inspector from the 
Department.  Any individual seeking certification as a qualified inspector shall 
meet at least one of the following qualifications:
(1) Is certified by the National Association of Amusement Ride Safety 
Officials as a Level I, Level II, or Level III amusement ride safety 
inspector; or
(2) Is a licensed mechanical or structural engineer; or
(3) Has a minimum of five (5) years work experience in the field of 
amusement attraction design, construction, or maintenance.
(B) Qualified inspectors shall pay a yearly registration fee of [$].  All such 
fees shall be deposited into the Amusement Attraction Safety Fund created by 
Section 20 of this [Act].
Comment
At least 24 states require fixed-site amusement attractions to be either employed 
by the regulating governmental entity or obtain certification from the regulating 
governmental entity.  The proposed model act does not distinguish between whether the 
inspector is employed by the regulating governmental entity or by a private entity in the 
marketplace.  
Instead, the proposed model act adopts an approach that focuses on the 
qualifications of the inspector rather than the specific employer of the inspector.  The 
proposed model act does not believe that amusement attraction safety requires that the 
regulating governmental entity directly employ inspectors—especially in light of a 
growing trend by state governments toward utilizing contract labor—but, rather, this 
issue should solely focus on the objective qualifications and competency of the inspector.
SECTION 9.  Powers and Duties of Inspectors and Department
(A) If a qualified inspector has reasonably concluded that an amusement 
attraction presents an imminent hazard to guests, the Commissioner may issue a 
temporary cease and desist order that prohibits the operation of the amusement 
attraction until such time as the Department has reasonably concluded that the 
amusement attraction operator has mitigated the imminently hazardous condition.  
(B) If a qualified inspector has reasonably concluded that an amusement 
attraction presents an imminent hazard to guests, the Commissioner may order the  
amusement attraction operator to make specific repairs or modifications to 
mitigate the imminently hazardous condition.
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(C) The Department shall mail a copy of any order that it issues under 
subsection (A) or (B) to an amusement attraction operator by certified mail, return 
receipt requested.  The amusement attraction operator shall have the right to 
appeal or contest any such order pursuant to the [State’s Administrative 
Procedures Act or equivalent]
(D) The Commissioner may enforce any order issued under this Section by 
seeking an injunction or writ of mandamus from a court of competent jurisdiction. 
Comment
At least, 36 states have laws that expressly allow inspectors to order repairs to 
amusement attractions.  At least 34 states also permit either an inspector or the 
Commissioner to order that an amusement attraction be closed for a specified period of 
time because of a safety hazard.
SECTION 10.  Requirement of Liability Insurance
(A) An amusement attraction operator must maintain one of the following 
forms of indemnity at all times during operation of an amusement attraction:
(1) An insurance policy in an amount not less than [$] per occurrence 
for any injury or death to a guest or other individual involving the 
amusement attraction; or,  
(2) A bond in an amount not less than [$], except that the aggregate 
liability of the surety under that bond shall not exceed the face amount of 
the bond; or,
(3) The amusement attraction operator satisfies all self- insurance 
standards promulgated by the [State’s Department of Insurance or 
equivalent] demonstrating that the amusement attraction operator 
maintains sufficient financial assets to cover any liability for an injury or 
death to a guest or other individual involving the use of the amusement 
attraction.
(B) An insurance policy or bond procured to satisfy the requirements of this 
Section must be obtained from an insurer or surety licensed by [State’s 
Department of Insurance or equivalent] to do business in this state.
Comment
At least 39 states require fixed-site amusement attraction operators to maintain 
some type of liability insurance or bond.  The amount of insurance required by these 39 
states is as follows:  18 states require at least $1,000,000 in liability coverage; two states 
require between $250,000 and $1,000,000 in liability coverage; one state requires less 
than $500,000 in liability coverage; three states do not specify a required amount of 
liability coverage; and 15 states require amounts that vary based upon factors such as the 
type of attraction.  
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SECTION 11.  Requirement of Incident Data Reporting
(A) In the event of a fatality or serious injury requiring immediate overnight 
hospitalization arising out of the operation of an amusement attraction, the
operator of the amusement attraction shall file a incident report with the 
Department within 48 hours from the time of the fatality or serious injury 
requiring immediate overnight hospitalization. 
(B) The incident report shall be in writing on a form promulgated by the 
Department and shall identify the amusement attraction on which the incident 
occurred, the identity of all individuals suffering a fatality or serious injury 
requiring immediate overnight hospitalization and shall generally describe the 
nature of the incident.  
(C) In addition to filing a written incident report, an amusement attraction 
operator shall also immediately notify a designated agent or employee of the 
Department by telephone of any incident resulting in a fatality.
(D) Written and verbal incident reports filed with the Department shall not be 
subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court 
proceeding or considered for other purposes in any action for damages arising 
from any incident subject to the provisions of this Section.
Comment
At least 24 states have a fixed-site amusement attraction safety law which requires 
that amusement attraction operators report certain injury incidents to the State.  All such 
states require that amusement attractions operators report deaths and serious injuries to 
the state regulating entity.  At least eight states have laws that may require the reporting 
of non-serious injuries.  The types of incidents required by these states to be reported 
include:  injuries requiring medical treatment, injuries requiring hospitalization, “any 
accident”, non-minor injuries, and injuries requiring “more than first aid.”  
The time frame for reporting such incidents range from immediately to within 
four hours to by the next business day to within 48 hours.  At least one state only requires 
incidents to be reported on a quarterly basis while at least one other state requires that 
such incidents be reported every two years.  At least two states have laws that do not 
specifically state the time frame within which incidents must be reported.
At least four states place the burden of reporting an incident upon the injured 
guest rather than the fixed-site amusement attraction operator.
SECTION 12.  Requirement of Records Retention
(A) An amusement attraction operator shall retain the following records for a 
period of five years:
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(1) the name and last known address of each individual that suffers a 
serious injury requiring immediate overnight hospitalization; and
(2) the initial inspection certificate and all renewal inspection 
certificates for each amusement attraction.
(B) Records whose retention is required by subsection (A) shall be available 
for inspection by the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s designee during 
normal business hours.
Comment
At least 17 states require fixed-site amusement attractions operators to maintain 
incident records or maintenance records for varying lengths of time.  
SECTION 13.  Inspection Fees
A fee in the following amount shall accompany any application for an amusement 
attraction inspection:
(A)  [$] for an initial application for a pre-operation inspection;
(B)  [$] for an application for all subsequent inspections.
(C) All such fees shall be deposited into the Amusement Attraction Safety 
Fund created by Section 20 of this [Act].
Comment
While the amount of fees is left for each State to determine, it is highly 
recommended that these fees be specifically assigned to a separate amusement attraction 
safety fund in order to mitigate increased state expenditures that might result from the 
enactment of such a law. 
SECTION 14.  Requirements of Amusement Attraction Attendants
(A) An amusement attraction attendant shall:
(1) be at least 16 years of age;
(2) control only one amusement attraction at a single time; 
(3) remain within the immediate proximity of the amusement 
attraction under the attendant’s control; and,
(4) not be under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substance.
(B) An amusement attraction operator shall not be responsible for the conduct 
of any attendant who purposefully violates the requirements of this Section unless 
the operator had sufficient prior notice to reasonably prevent such conduct.
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Comment
At least 13 states have laws that require attraction attendants to be of a minimum 
age.  Five of these states require that the ride operator be at least 18 years of age while 
eight of these states require that the ride operator be at least 16 years of age.
SECTION 15.  Requirement of Safety Information Posting
(A) An amusement attraction operator shall post in a conspicuous and 
permanent location at each amusement attraction the following safety 
information:
(1) A concise summary of guidelines for safe guest use of the 
amusement attraction; and,
(2) A concise summary of recommended and/or mandatory guest use 
restrictions of the amusement attraction; and,
(3) A concise summary of prohibited guest conduct relative to the use 
of the amusement attraction; and,
(4) A statement that reads: "State law requires guests to obey all 
warnings and directions for this attraction and behave in a manner that will 
not cause or contribute to injuring themselves or others.  Violators may be 
punished by fine and/or imprisonment."
(B) Nothing in this Section shall operate to limit an amusement attraction 
operator’s right to revoke a guest’s admittance privilege or otherwise implement 
reasonable administrative measures to address guest violations of this Section, 
Section (17) of this [Act], or Section (18) of this [Act].
Comment
At least 16 states have laws that require an amusement attraction operator to post 
for guests certain safety information related to the amusement attraction.
SECTION 16.  Requests for Regulatory Variances
(A) An amusement attraction operator may apply to the Commissioner for a 
variance from the requirements of this [Act] or any regulation promulgated 
pursuant to this [Act] if:
(1) a variance is necessary to prevent an undue hardship upon the 
amusement attraction operator; and,  
(2) the Department has concluded that the issuance of the variance will 
not limit or prejudice the safe use of the amusement attractions by guests.
(B) No variance shall be issued for an amusement attraction that has 
previously failed to pass an inspection pursuant to Section 7 of this [Act].
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Comment
At least, 14 states have laws that provide a mechanism for an amusement 
attraction operator to request a variance from existing safety regulatory requirements. 
SECTION 17.  Right to Refuse Entry
(A) An amusement attraction operator may refuse entry to the amusement 
attraction to any guest if the operator reasonably believes that allowing the guest 
to enter may jeopardize the safety of the guest or any other individual including, 
without limitation, other guests, employees of the operator, agents of the operator 
or bystanders. 
(B) An operator shall not be held criminally or civilly liable for any refusal to 
permit entry if the operator’s refusal is based upon a reasonable belief that the 
guest’s entry may jeopardize the safety of any individual.
Comment
At least 13 states permit amusement attraction operators the right to refuse entry 
to certain members of the general public if necessary for safety requirements.  While 
intended to address situations where certain physical characteristics of an individual 
might increase safety risks to that individual or others, such provisions must obviously be 
drafted to avoid a violation of the American with Disabilities Act or similar type of 
statute.
SECTION 18.  Guest Safety Duties
(A) Each guest shall comply with the following safety duties related to the use
of an amusement attraction:
(1) Each guest shall comply with all written warnings and directions 
that require a person to satisfy certain conditions or to refrain from certain 
actions regarding use of amusement ride; and,
(2) Each guest shall refrain from engaging in any behavior or conduct 
during use of an amusement attraction that may cause or contribute to 
injuring the guest or any other individual.
(B) Any guest that fails to comply with any of the safety duties in this Section 
shall be considered in breach of that duty and subject to a misdemeanor offense 
pursuant to [State’s criminal code or equivalent].
Comment
At least 13 states have laws that contain a provision outlining the duties and 
responsibilities of guests of an amusement attraction.  These laws, often termed Rider 
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Responsibility Laws, generally prohibit a guest from engaging in certain conduct that 
might increase the safety risks to that individual or other guests. 
SECTION 19.  Enforcement and Penalties
(A) Criminal Penalty.  An amusement attraction operator who violates this 
[Act] is guilty of a [misdemeanor] [felony] and, upon conviction, is punishable by 
[fine and/or imprisonment].
(B) Administrative Penalty.  The Commissioner may assess an administrative 
penalty against an amusement attraction operator not to exceed [$] for a violation 
of this [Act].
Comment
Of the 48 states that currently have laws regulating fixed-site amusement 
attractions, 38 of those states have provisions that allow the Commissioner (or other state 
governmental authority) to assess administrative fines against an amusement attraction 
operator for violating the law or regulations.  
The procedure for imposing an administrative penalty under this Act and 
complying with due process requirements are hereby reserved for the State's 
administrative procedures law or equivalent law.
SECTION 20.  Amusement Attraction Safety Fund
(A) All inspection fees received under this [Act] shall be deposited into a 
special revenue account located in the state treasury and known as the 
"Amusement Attraction Safety Fund". 
(B) The Department shall use the monies in this account to enforce the 
provisions of this article, subject to disbursement guidelines promulgated by the 
[State Treasurer or equivalent].
Comment
At least eight states have provisions within their fixed-site amusement attraction 
safety law that establish a dedicated amusement attraction fund.  The establishment of 
such a dedicated fund is recommended as a method for tracking the expenses of a fixed-
site amusement attraction regulatory effort as well as ensuring that the fees and fines 
generated from that effort are utilized to pay for at least a portion of the additional 
expenditures resulting from this effort.
SECTION 21.  Limitation of Governmental Liability
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No portion of this [Act] shall be construed as subjecting the State or any political 
subdivision of the State to any liability resulting from any injury or damages involving an 
amusement attraction.
SECTION 22.  Confidentiality of Proprietary Information
The Department shall not disclose any information submitted to the Department by an 
amusement attraction operator pursuant to the requirements of this [Act] that is marked as 
“Proprietary” or “Confidential” by the operator unless the Department is directed to do so 
by an order or decree from a court of competent jurisdiction.  
SECTION 23.   Severability.
If any provision of this [Act] is held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the 
remainder of this [Act] shall be remain valid and enforced.
SECTION 24. Repealed Acts and Chapters.
The following acts and parts of acts are hereby repealed: [ ]
SECTION 25. Effective Date.
This [Act] shall take effect as of [ ].
